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ABSTRACT:  An inflow of immigrants into a region impacts house prices in three ways. 
For a fixed level of local population, housing demand rises due to the increase in foreign-
born population. In addition, immigrants can influence native location decisions and induce 
additional shifts in demand. Finally, changes in housing supply conditions can in turn affect 
prices. Existing reduced form estimates of the effect of immigration on house prices capture 
the sum of all these effects. In this paper I propose a methodology to identify the different 
channels driving the total effect. I show that, conditional on supply, total changes in 
housing demand can be decomposed into the sum of direct immigrant demand and indirect 
demand changes from relocated population. The size and sign of the indirect demand effect 
depends on the impact of immigration on native mobility. I use Spanish data during the 
period 2001-2012 to estimate the different elements of the decomposition, applying an 
instrumental variables strategy to obtain consistent coefficients. The results show that 
overlooking the impact of immigration on native location induces a sizeable difference 
between the total and the immigrant demand effects, affecting the interpretation of the 
estimates. 
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1 Introduction
The study of the local economic impact of immigration in the receiving regions has been a very active
area of research in the last 25 years. Large immigration inflows impact the spatial distribution of po-
pulation within a country as the location choices of the foreign-born change the composition and
size of local population. The arrival of new immigrants directly increases the population of the re-
ceiving region. In addition, they can influence the location decisions of natives, indirectly changing
the population size in all locations. Immigrants can be different from natives in their level of skills
(Lewis & Peri, 2015). These changes impact local labour markets, affecting average wages and em-
ployment rates. Changes in the labour market conditions interact with other economic aspects such
as productivity or skills composition, and can ultimately influence growth and welfare. Recently, re-
search has focused on the impact of immigration on a richer set of economic and social outcomes like
productivity, school choices, public finances and spending or crime1. Given the unprecedented level
of immigration inflows in Spain in the 2000s, a number of empirical works have analysed the impact
of immigration on various economic outcomes2.
A small number of papers have provided evidence on the impact of immigration on (consump-
tion) goods prices (Lach, 2007; Corte´s, 2008; Zachariadis, 2011, 2012; Frattini, 2014). Zachariadis (2012)
discusses three theoretical effects of an increase of low-skilled immigration on prices: increase in ag-
gregated demand (positive), increase in the search of low-priced goods (negative) and increase in
supply of cheap labour for the production of labour-intense goods and services (negative). Empiri-
cally, these papers have mostly found net negative effects. In the case of housing, which is by nature
an inelastic good, the adjustment of its costs to an increase of local population might be different3.
For a given housing supply and local population stock, following an increase in foreign-born po-
pulation, intensified spatial competition on the consumption of housing services may initially push
prices up. The total impact depends also on the response of housing supply conditions and on any
additional changes in local population following the immigration inflow. The sign and magnitude of
the reduced-form coefficient is thus ambiguous.
Existing evidence for the US (for example Saiz, 2003, 2007; Ottaviano & Peri, 2012a) has found po-
sitive estimates of immigration on both rents and prices4. A handful of papers (Hatton & Tani, 2005;
Saiz & Wachter, 2011; Accetturo et al., 2014; Sa´, 2015) have in contrast estimated negative impacts of
immigration on average house prices, in particular when focusing on small areas. The displacement
of (wealthy) natives from these neighbourhoods is the main argument used to explain these nega-
tive findings but, except in Sa´ (2015), this effect has not been directly estimated in the data. In the
case of Spain, a few papers have studied the role of immigration on housing markets (Talavull de la
Paz, 2003; Sosvilla-Rivero, 2008; Garcı´a-Montalvo, 2010; Nicodemo & Raya, 2012). Gonza´lez & Or-
tega (2013) provide estimates of the impact of immigration on Spanish house prices and construction
over the period 2000-2010, but their aim and approach is different from those of the present paper5.
1Pekkala-Kerr & Kerr (2011); Ottaviano & Peri (2013); Borjas (2014) and Chiswick & Miller (2015) summarize the existing
evidence.
2Most of the papers have focused on the labour market impacts (Bentolila et al., 2008; Carrasco et al., 2008; Gonza´lez
& Ortega, 2010; Amuedo-Dorantes & de la Rica, 2011; Farre´ et al., 2011; Amuedo-Dorantes & Rica, 2013), but a number
of contributions have studied other aspects like the effect of immigration on the output mix (Requena et al., 2009), trade
(Peri & Requena, 2010), productivity (Kangasniemi et al., 2012), local public spending (Jofre-Monseny et al., 2016), school
choices (Farre´ et al., 2015) or crime (Alonso-Borrego et al., 2012). See De la Rica et al. (2014) for a recent revision of this
literature.
3Throughout the paper I refer generally to house prices including rental and transaction prices. When I refer to house
prices as opposed to rents, the term corresponds to transaction prices.
4Other studies include Stillman & Mare´ (2008) who provide positive impact estimates for New Zealand; Degen &
Fischer (2009) who find positive effects for Switzerland; Akbari & Aydede (2012) find positive but small impacts in Canada;
Frostad (2014) estimates the impact in Norway; and Ku¨rschner (2017) for Germany. More recently, Tumen (2016) study the
impact of the Syrian refugees inflow on Turkish housing rents and finds a positive effect on high quality units and no effect
on low-quality units.
5In their paper the authors use population as the main regressor and estimate the direct immigrant impact on the two
outcomes. However, they do not specifically investigate the impact of native mobility in the interpretation of estimates
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My paper adds to this literature and, in addition to estimating the reduced-form coefficients, I focus
on the identification and estimation of the channels driving the total effect. To do this, I exploit data
Spanish regional (province) data on immigrant inflows and housing costs (prices and rents) during
the period 2001–2012.
To disentangle the mechanisms behind the total impact, I proceed in three steps. First, I estimate
a similar specification to Saiz (2007). I regress the annual local house cost growth on normalised im-
migration inflows or an immigration rate, which is defined as the change in foreign-born population
divided by the beginning-of-the-year local population. I obtain estimates for both house (transaction)
prices and rents. To be able to make causal claims about the estimates, I use a modified version of
the standard immigration shift-share instrument (Card, 2001). The preferred estimated elasticities are
approximately 0.8% for rents and 3.1% for house prices6. These coefficients correspond to the total
effect. Next, I explicitly test the impact of immigrant inflows on native mobility and, consistently
with existing estimates for Spain (Ferna´ndez-Huertas et al., 2009), I find that immigrants attract na-
tives to areas in which they locate (approximately 35 natives for each 100 immigrants). This sizeable
co-location estimate is unusual, but not unique in the literature7.
Given this finding, I argue that overlooking the impact of immigration on native location induces
a sizeable difference between the total and the immigrant demand effects, affecting the interpretation
of the estimates. Section 2.4 shows that this difference is due to the additional changes in demand
from relocated population. These additional changes can be positive or negative, depending on the
sign of the impact of immigration on native mobility. To identify the impact of immigration on prices
that is only due to increased immigrant housing demand (“partial” effect), in the last step I use popu-
lation growth rate as the main regressor. I then re-estimate the coefficient using solely the variation
on population growth which is due to exogenous location of immigrants (predicted by the instru-
ment). The estimated immigrant demand elasticities using this methodology are 0.6% for rents and
around 2.9% for house prices. As demonstrated algebraically, the comparison of the empirical esti-
mates shows that the difference between both types of estimates corresponds exactly to the increase
in demand from natives locating in the region contemporaneously to the immigrant inflow.
I furthermore explore the impact that controlling for changes in housing supply have on the
estimates and I find that they have very little effect on the coefficients. When the effect of supply
conditions is partialled-out, the impacts correspond to total and immigrant demand changes. My
results are robust across specifications, to the use of different data sources, of different definitions of
the instrument and remain very similar when using 5-year differences instead of year-to-year varia-
tions. Finally, in Section 4, I propose a simple model to explain the mechanisms behind the results:
an inflow of immigrants increases housing costs in the receiving region but, due to the specialisation
of natives and immigrants on different production sectors, it also attracts natives to the region, incre-
asing house costs even further. The model predicts that the total demand effect would be larger than
the immigrant demand effect, which is what I find in the empirical exercise.
The current paper makes several contributions. First, by combining the estimating equations, I
show that the coefficient that captures total demand changes can be formally decomposed as the
sum of direct (immigrant) demand changes plus induced demand shifts from relocated population.
This is the first paper to provide causal estimates of all the elements of the decomposition, and in
particular, to identify the relationship between them. This decomposition provides a framework for
an improved economic interpretation of total impact coefficients. Secondly, in order to make causal
claims about the estimates, I construct a shift-share instrument that combines historical immigrant
location patterns with predicted national inflows by country of origin obtained from a push-factors
gravity model. This is an improved version of the standard ethnic networks instrument widely used
which is central for the analysis in my paper and do not provide a detailed discussion on the channels driving the net
results.
6Directly comparable to Saiz (2007) estimates of around 0.9% for rents and 3.3% for prices and similar to other existing
estimates.
7Mocetti & Porello (2010) and Wozniak & Murray (2012) find similar size estimates of co-location of natives and immi-
grants.
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in the immigration literature (Card, 2001) and it is the first time it is applied to Spanish data. Thirdly,
in my estimations I control for the role of changes in housing supply conditions either by using time-
invariant local supply-related attributes or by directly controlling (and instrumenting) for changes in
housing stocks. By doing this, my estimates correspond to demand impacts, which makes their inter-
pretation more straightforward. Finally, I estimate the effects of immigrants not only on transaction
house prices, but also on rents. Given that renting is the primary housing tenancy mode for recently
arrived immigrants, it is important to also uncover their impact on Spanish rental costs8, and this is
the first paper that provides such evidence.
The results of this paper highlight the importance of taking into account the impact of immigra-
tion on local population mobility when interpreting its effect on local aggregated outcomes. Total
demand changes are the result of direct and indirect demand changes, and if these have opposing
signs, the net estimates might be close to zero but masking sizeable partial adjustments. The impact
of displacement on the identification of aggregate effects gained renewed interest after the publica-
tion of Borjas (2003). This paper criticized regional immigration studies of the labour market impacts
of foreign-born inflows, claiming that the United States worked as a single labour market and that
the existence of displacement hindered the estimation of regional effects. This question has been dis-
cussed in the immigration literature but this is the first paper to directly address it both formally
and empirically. Most existing papers (Saiz, 2007; Corte´s, 2008; Gonza´lez & Ortega, 2013) rely on the
existing US evidence9 to argue that native area displacement due to immigration is small or not large
enough to cancel out increased demand stemming from increased area population so its impact on
the estimates is irrelevant. My findings suggest that the impact of immigrants on native location is
of greater importance than it has driven attention to in the literature, and imply that one needs to
provide estimates of its size when making claims about its role on the estimation of the effects. This
issue is not unique to the analysis of the impact on housing prices, but also applies to any setting
where displacement might affect the estimation of local treatment effects. Meaningful economic in-
terpretation of the parameters require that we better understand the different partial effects behind
the total effect coefficients.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology: the empirical
specification is explained in 2.1, the identification strategy in 2.2, the discussion on how to identify
the effect of foreign-born demand in 2.3 and the formal decomposition of the total effect into its
elements is exposed in section 2.4. Section 3 presents the regression results. Section 4 develops a
simple theoretical model to provide insights on the channels driving the empirical finding. Section
5 discusses the validity of the instrumental variables strategy and provides a large set of robustness
checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology
2.1 Empirical specification
In order to estimate the causal effect of changes in foreign-born population on house prices growth,
I use a linear empirical specification similar to Saiz (2007):
∆ log (hpri,t) = β
(
∆FBi,t−1
POPi,t−2
)
+ φ′Zi + δ′∆Xi,t−2 + λt + γr/i + ε i,t (1)
The geographical units of observation are the 50 Spanish provinces i, which are grouped into 17
regions r10. t denotes time periods (years). ∆ log(hpri,t) is the change of the natural logarithm of house
8According to data from the 2007 National Immigration Survey – “Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes, 70% of those arrived
after 2001 live in rented properties.
9See Peri & Sparber (2011) for a recent critical review of this literature.
10Provinces correspond to the European NUTS3 and (autonomous) regions to NUTS2. I exclude the African territories
due to their historical particularities and the lack of reliable data.
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prices (transaction or rental prices) in province i during year t, ∆FBi,t−1/POPi,t−2 is the normalised
immigration inflow during t− 1 (N∆FBi,t−1), λt are time fixed effects, γr/i are area fixed effects (either
NUTS2 or NUTS3), Zi is a matrix of province time-invariant attributes and ∆Xi,t−2 is a matrix of
province time-varying controls. Finally, ε i,t is the random error term.
The independent variable of interest is the normalised immigration inflow (or immigration gro-
wth rate): it is defined as the (net) inflow of immigrants into province i during a given period divided
by the province initial population). The inflow of immigrants during t− 1 is calculated as the (net)
change in the foreign-born population between the end of t− 1 and the end of t− 211. Population in
t− 2 denotes the stock of total residents (natives and foreign-born) at end of period t− 2. Given the
nature of housing services, the main specification uses the immigration inflows lagged one period
with respect to changes in prices.
Using normalised immigration inflows instead of (log) net inflows as the measure of “immigra-
tion” eliminates any unobservables that might equally affect both the numerator (immigration in-
flow) and the denominator (original province population). Standardising immigration inflows by
initial population stock deals with the fact that regions of different sizes have different population
and house price dynamics (Card, 2001; Peri & Sparber, 2011; Wozniak & Murray, 2012). Scale effects
can induce spurious correlation between higher inflows and higher price changes. This correlation
could arise due to the fact that the average and standard deviation of both variables are likely to be
proportional to the total population in the province12. In this set-up the coefficient of interest is inter-
preted as a semi-elasticity: an increase in the rate of one percentage point has effect on the change in
prices of β percentage points13.
In order to estimate the parameter of interest β consistently I start by using a first-differences
specification and a large set of control variables and time and area fixed effects. The first differences
setting of equation (1) eliminates any unobservable province characteristics which might be corre-
lated with the level of house prices and the level of foreign-born population in the province. Time
fixed effects λt control for common shocks affecting the growth of prices of all provinces in Spain in
a given year. There could still exist some unobserved factors at the area level which are correlated
with changes in house prices and changes in foreign-born stocks. Not including these would bias
the estimation of β. To tackle this issue, first I include area fixed effects γr/i. In some specifications
I use region (NUTS2) fixed effects (γr) and in the most demanding specification I include province
(NUTS3) fixed effects (γi). This specification corresponds to a first differences fixed effects estimation
(e.g. growth regression fixed effects14).
Vector Zi contains time-invariant province attributes. These variables control for the fact that pro-
vinces with different levels of the time-invariant characteristics might have different growth trends in
the house prices levels and in the stocks of foreign-born population. When region fixed effects (γr) are
also included, the province attributes control for differential growth trends of the provinces around
their common regional trend. Some of these attributes are time-invariant and some correspond to pre-
period values (2001 or before). There are four sets of province attributes included: location/amenities
attributes, socio-economic attributes, geography/land regulation attributes and housing market at-
tributes. Adding controls for changes in housing supply would reduce omitted variable bias related
to factors driving both immigration and dwelling construction. Once this bias is reduced, the coef-
ficient of the normalised immigration inflow variable would correspond to a (total or immigrant)
demand estimate and be conditioned-out from any (time-invariant) effects related to changes in the
11The Spanish administrative population data is dated on the 1st of January. Referring to the end of t− 2 is equivalent to
referring to the beginning of t− 1. The equivalent inflow would be the (net) change between January of t and January of
t− 1
12In addition to the standarisation, I control for the effect of initial population trends by either including it directly in the
specifications or by using province-fixed effects.
13Additionally, this format allows a more straightforward comparison to existing estimates in papers that have used a
similar specification.
14Wozniak & Murray (2012) use a similar specification and refer to it as the “random trend model for panel data” (Wool-
dridge, 2002)
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housing supply. When I use province fixed effects, I control for all time-invariant attributes, so all the
province attributes included in Zi drop.
Finally, vector ∆Xi,t−2 contains time-varying characteristics (change between t − 3 and t − 2). I
control for changes in average output, wages and education levels, unemployment rate, conditions
in the financial sector, infrastructure endowments and sectoral composition. If the variables included
in Xi,t−2 are “bad” controls –variables that could well be outcome variables in equation (1) (Angrist &
Pischke, 2009)–, their inclusion would not reduce the omitted variable bias. To mitigate this potential
problem, I use a lag with respect to immigration inflow variable, so the variables are measured one
year before the immigrants locate in the province. Hence, I use changes in the variables during t− 2,
one period before the inflows (t− 1) and two periods before the change in prices (t).
2.2 Instrumental variables strategy
Even after including area dummies and controls, consistent estimation of β requires the regressor of
interest to be uncorrelated with the time-varying part of the error term (local time-varying shocks
affecting price growth and immigrant location at the same time). There is no prior on the direction of
the bias. The estimated β could be upward biased if immigrants are going to provinces with positive
shocks or unobserved better economic prospects, while it would be downward biased if, for some
reason, immigrants locate in province in which prices are growing slower (conditional on all the time-
varying and time-invariant controls). To deal with the identification problem I use an instrumental
variables (IV) strategy. I construct the instrument adapting the “shift-share” methodology, which has
extensively been used before, for instance by Card (2001), Ottaviano & Peri (2006) or Peri (2009).
Intuitively, a province-year prediction of the foreign-born stock is constructed by distributing year-
to-year variation of the national totals (the “shift”) across different locations, using some pattern (the
“share”), to allocate this magnitude.
The normalised immigration inflow (change in foreign-born population) in equation (1), N∆FBi,t−1,
is defined as the immigration inflow during t− 1 divided by total population (foreign-born plus na-
tives) at the end of t− 2. The inflow of immigrants during t− 1 is calculated as the (net) change in the
(end-of-the-year) foreign-born population between t− 2 and t− 1. Denoting foreign-born population
stock as FB we can express the normalised change in province i as:
N∆FBi,t−1 =
∆FBi,t−1
POPi,t−2
=
∆FBi,t−1
FBi,t−2 + NATi,t−2
=
FBi,t−1 − FBi,t−2
FBi,t−2 + NATi,t−2
(2)
The most common immigration shift-share instrument exploits the fact that, to take advantage
of social and economic established networks, immigrants tend to disproportionately locate in areas
where immigrants from the same nationality or ethnicity have located before (ethnic networks instru-
ment). To predict current location patterns, I use historical location patterns to construct the “share”
distribution. For the national yearly immigration inflow, I use different approaches (details below).
In order to compute a prediction (2), I predict the stock of foreign-born by year and nationality, and I
sum these predictions to calculate the total province foreign-born stocks. I also use it in denominator
as part of total population.
To impute the yearly immigrant population by province and by nationality of origin, I first calcu-
late the share of immigrants (over the total number in Spain) that were located in that province in the
base year15. The main base year used for “past” location patterns is 1991. I denote provinces with r16,
time periods with t, nationalities or ethnic groups with n (N being the total number of nationalities).
This share is the proportion of immigrants located in a particular province i over the total immigrants
15The list of the nationalities used appears in Table A.2.
16i is the specific province for which we are calculating the share and R is the 50 provinces in Spain
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from the same nationality located in Spain in 1991:
shareni,1991 =
FBni,1991
∑Rr FBnr,1991
=
FBni,1991
FBnSpain,1991
(3)
To obtain yearly predictions of the number of immigrants by nationality n, I multiply expression
(3) by the annual national stock of immigrants of nationality n. This stock is calculated adding the
number of foreign-born of that nationality in all provinces in Spain except i, in year t. I exclude pro-
vince i from the summation to avoid using the stock I am trying to instrument for in the construction
of the prediction of foreign-born. This stock is province-nationality specific because for each province
i we exclude its own foreign-born stock:
FBnSpain i,t =∑
R
r 6=i FB
n
r,t (4)
The imputed foreign-born stock of a specific nationality n in province i at time t is thus calculated
allocating yearly total national stocks (4) weighted by its historical share (3):
imp FBni,t =
(
FBnSpain i,t
)
∗ shareni,1991 (5)
To calculate the imputed total (all nationalities) foreign-born stock in province i at time t, I sum (5)
across nationalities:
imp FBi,t =∑Nn
(
imp FBni,t
)
(6)
Note that the instrument is constructed from combining nationality-specific predictions in every pro-
vince (a weighted sum of the national-minus-province inflows using the nationality 1991 stock as
weights). As the estimated specification (1) includes year and province fixed effects (or region and
province attributes), a shift-share that did not have this province-specific nationality-mix aggregation
would be highly or completely collinear with the fixed effects. Moreover, this construction allows to
account for the fact that different provinces would have different treatment levels depending on the
nationality mix of the foreign-born inflow.
In order to obtain the first instrument for the normalised immigration inflow as defined in expres-
sion (2), this imputed inflow is divided by the imputed population (imputed foreign-born plus native
stock) in province i at the beginning of the period t− 1. The instrument is constructed as follows:
IV1 N∆FBi,t−1 =
(imp FBi,t−1 − imp FBi,t−2)
imp FBi,t−2 + NATi,t−2
=
imp ∆FBi,t−1
imp POPi,t−2
(7)
For this instrument to be valid it has to be sufficiently correlated with the immigration rate but un-
correlated with the local shocks that affect house price variation, conditional on the controls and area
and time fixed effects. The relevance of the instrument can be assessed by the value of the F-statistic
of the instrument in the first stage of the 2-stage-least-squares (2SLS) regressions, and additionally
by using weak identification tests17.
The validity of the instrument relies on the two components of (5) being uncorrelated to local
shocks related to the outcome variable. Regarding the local share of immigrants by nationality in
the base year, the exclusion restriction requires that the only channel through which foreign-born
geographical distribution in 1991 affects current changes in house prices is through its influence
on shaping the current immigrants location patterns, conditional on controls. In other words, the
unobserved factors determining the location of immigrants in one province with respect to another in
the base year (1991) have to be uncorrelated with the relative economic prospects of the two provinces
during the period of analysis (2001-2012). I consider 1991 to be separated enough from 2001 for this
17All the result tables in section 3 provide the Kleinbergen-Paap statistic (test of weak identification), which is robust to
non-i.i.d error terms, and corresponds roughly to the t-stat of the included instruments in the first-stage to the square. In
some tables we also include the first-stage coefficients.
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condition to be valid18. In the robustness checks, I calculate the imputed figures using older base
years (1985 and 1981), even if the instrument become weaker, the results hold.
A good instrument requires that the total national flow of immigrants in a given year to be exo-
genous to specific province unobservable local shocks. This condition depends on how the current
national stock of immigrants of nationality n is constructed. First, to avoid using the actual inflow for
that we want to instrument for in the construction of our prediction (just scaled by shareni,base), term
(4) is defined as the total inflow of immigrants from nationality n coming to Spain at time t minus
the inflow of immigrants from nationality n coming to province i at time t. Yet, we still require this
term to be orthogonal to current local shocks. This assumption may be violated if location in provin-
ces other than i is correlated with unobservable economic conditions of province i at a given point
in time t. This is plausible, specially if our spatial units are small and the economic conditions that
attract immigrants are spatially correlated. For example, the economic condition in “economically
big” provinces (like Madrid or Barcelona) could influence the total number of immigrants deciding
to come to Spain, even if they end up locating somewhere else (based on their ethnic networks).
To solve this issue, a similar strategy to Saiz (2007) and Ortega & Peri (2009) is adopted. I compute
the yearly predicted total stock and inflow of immigrants by country of origin from the results of a
gravity model which depends only on push factors. These predictions replace term (4) in equation
(5). Details of this procedure are given in the Appendix (section A.2.1). Using the predictions from
estimating equation (A.1) in (A.2) to obtain (A.3), I redefine the instrument as:
IV2 N∆FBi,t−1 ==
imp pred ∆FBi,t−1
imp pred FBi,t−2 + NATi,t−2
(8)
However, a final issue with the construction of (8) might still make the instrument invalid. Total
population stock, which appears in the denominator, is the result of the sum of the foreign-born (im-
puted prediction) plus the natives. As discussed in Section 2.3, the number of total natives residing
in a given province might depend on the number of foreign-born in the same location or on unob-
servables correlated with house price growth. For this reason, I use a similar shift-share strategy to
compute a prediction for the location of natives pr NATi,t−1, based on past location patterns. Details
on this procedure are given in the Appendix (section A.2.2). Replacing the actual native stock by its
imputed number in equation (8), I finally define the main instrument as:
IVmain N∆FBi,t−1 ==
imp pred ∆FBi,t−1
imp pred FBi,t−2 + imp NATi,t−2
(9)
I use IVmain N∆FBi,t−1 in the main IV estimation results and different versions of it in the robustness
checks. In section 5.1 I discuss and test the validity of this instrumental variables approach and in
section 5.2 I check if the results are robust to using different definitions of the shift and share in the
construction of the instrument.
2.3 Identifying the impact of immigrant demand on prices
The IV estimation of the β coefficient of (1) yields consistent estimates of the total impact of immi-
gration on prices. The sign and magnitude of this coefficient is a priori ambiguous. Foreign-born
population inflows, by increasing local population, can have an immediate positive impact on house
prices growth. The economic intuition behind this is a simple demand-supply result. For a given level
of population in a region, after a large immigration inflow, increased competition in housing markets
forces both newly arrived immigrants and stayers to bid higher to buy or rent existing properties.
Keeping supply constant, a positive immigration inflow into a region is directly translated into an
18Between 1991 and 2001 there was an important economic crisis (1992-1993) followed by economic recovery and growth
(from 1997). It is unlikely that 1991 immigrants were able to predict these future shocks (or any other shock not captured
in the area/time fixed effects) ten years before our period of analysis starts.
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increase in demand of housing services, pushing up prices. But as native mobility and supply adjust,
the sign of the net impact is unclear.
This is the intuition behind the model developed in Saiz (2007). An increase in foreign-born po-
pulation in a given location raises total population and then pushes demand and prices in the “short
run”. The total net impact (“long-run”) on prices also depends on changes on housing consumption
(density), on housing supply (construction) and on the mobility of natives or previous residents (dis-
placement) following the immigration inflow 19. Unless we partial-out these adjustments, an estimate
of β in equation (1) would capture the combination of all these mechanisms. The use of instrumental
variables and controls yields unbiased estimates of the (reduced-form) total effect coefficient, but it
does not help with interpreting the channels behind it. It has been argued that the changes in demand
induced by relocated population cannot be separately identified from changes in immigrant demand.
In this section I propose an empirical method to isolate the immigrant demand effect (immigrant de-
mand) from the total effect. Section 2.4 presents the formal decomposition of the total effect into its
components.
The total demand effect of immigration inflows on any local economic outcomes depends on what
the most of the literature has called “native displacement”. The role of native mobility having an ef-
fect on the estimates of the regional labour market impacts of immigration has been widely discussed
(Hanson, 2009; Peri & Sparber, 2011). When estimating local average impacts of immigration inflows,
one needs to take into account that changes in population in a given area affect the whole regions-
cities system equilibrium. The relocation of population across regions within a country would hinder
the identification of any area-level effects, as the effects would dissipate throughout the country. If
large population outflows are triggered by immigration, the net area impact would tend towards
zero. When displacement exists, cross-region regressions would underestimate the effect of immi-
grants on local outcomes (Peri & Sparber, 2011). In the analysis of the impact of immigration on local
labour market outcomes, the existence of native displacement has been used as an explanation for
the lack of robust estimates of the impact of immigration on wages across US labour markets (Borjas,
2006).
As in the case of labour markets, native mobility affects the estimation of the average effect of
immigration on local house prices. Any reduced-form estimate would be the net result of changes
in housing demand which stems from the newly arrived population plus any changes in demand
related to natives relocation. The impact of mobility on the interpretation of the reduced-form area
estimates is generally inferred from the sign of the total estimate. In the case of the impact on house
prices, if the reduced-form estimate is positive it is assumed that natives are little or not displaced by
immigrants (Gonza´lez & Ortega, 2013). The sign of the total effect is also interpreted as a test of “na-
tive complete displacement” (Saiz, 2007). The impact of immigrants on native mobility is generally
not directly investigated in these studies 20.
In contrast, I estimate the effect of immigration inflows on native location decisions. As suggested
by Peri & Sparber (2011) to test the impact of immigration on native mobility I use a normalised
change in native population in the left-hand-side of a specification similar to (1) and estimate:(
∆NATi,t
POPi,t−1
)
= α
(
∆FBi,t
POPi,t−1
)
+ γt + γr/i + φ
′Zi + δ′∆Xi,t−1 + ε i,t (10)
19The theoretical discussion in Saiz’s paper uses short-run and long-run adjustments terms. As explained by the author,
by short-run he refers to a situation where native mobility and housing supply cannot adjust and by long-run when they do.
In the empirical results of his paper he uses both annual first-differences models and decennial long-differences models, but
the interpretation of the coefficient is always the same – the total (reduced-form) effect. In fact, as discussed in Lewis & Peri
(2015), when economists analyses the “short-run” effects of immigrants they try to isolate the consequences of immigration
on one variable keeping the rest fixed. They claimed that this should be called the “partial” effect. In this paper I refer to
total effect when we allow for adjustments in the three dimensions and to immigrant demand effect (“partial”) as the direct
increase in demand from recently arrived immigrants.
20One exception is Sa´ (2015), who estimates the total effect of immigrants on UK house prices and, when investigating
the channels driving her negative results, also estimates the impact of immigrations on native mobility. She finds both
coefficients to be (largely) negative but, contrary to me, she does not study the relationship between them.
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where the variables in the right-hand-side denote the same elements as in equation (1). The sign and
size of α captures the relationship between immigration inflows and native location. If the estimated
α is negative this would indicate that natives are leaving the regions where the immigrants locate:
displacement would be complete if α = −1 or less than proportional if −1 < α < 021. If natives are
attracted to the same regions as immigrants α > 0. If no causal relationship exists between immigra-
tion and native location, we can be quite certain that, conditional on housing supply, coefficient β in
equation (1) is only capturing the effect of (increased demand from) immigration on prices. In this
case, the immigrant demand and total impact would be the same, conditional on changes in hou-
sing supply. However, if a sizeable causal relationship exists, we need to be more cautious about the
interpretation of the results.
I discuss the estimation of equation (10) in section 3.3. To obtain consistent estimates of α I use
the same first-differences instrumental variables as in the estimation of (1). I find robust positive
co-location between immigrants and natives and the IV coefficients are around 0.3422. This result
might seem surprising, as most of the literature assumes that local residents might “fly-out” to other
areas due to increased competition for jobs and in the consumption of local amenities and housing
23. However, this assumption relies on immigrants and natives being homogenous in characteristics.
Immigrants and natives of similar characteristics (for example low-skilled) could be competing for
the same (low-paid) jobs, thus we can expect immigrants to have some displacement effects on nati-
ves within narrowly defined labour market. If immigrants are heterogeneous and complementary to
natives they might mitigate the displacement effect or even co-locate in the same regions as natives.
Recent papers (Ottaviano & Peri, 2008; Peri & Sparber, 2009; Manacorda et al., 2012; Peri, 2012;
Ottaviano & Peri, 2013; Ottaviano et al., 2013) have argued that, if native and immigrants are imper-
fect substitutes and specialise in different tasks, immigrants can promote efficient task specialisation
and have a productivity-enhancing effect, increasing native wages. Immigrant and natives could
also complement each other if they consume different goods (Mazzolari & Neumark, 2012). Natives
could also co-locate with immigrants if these are attractive to them because they provide cheaper
labour-intense goods (as suggested by Corte´s, 2008) or because they generate positive externalities
on natives wages or rents (Ottaviano & Peri, 2006, 2007). More generally, one can think that increa-
sed population in a region after the immigrant inflow would create more jobs and wealth via local
multipliers (Moretti, 2010).
Some contributions highlight the importance of taking into account the income/skill level of na-
tive and immigrants when looking at displacement effects. Mocetti & Porello (2010) find positive
associations between immigrant inflows and highly-educated natives and they suggest that this is
due to potential complementarities. Wozniak & Murray (2012) also find that positive co-location be-
tween low-skilled immigrant and natives and displacement between high-skilled ones24. In order to
explain the sign of my results I present a simple spatial equilibrium model in Section 4 that predicts
co-location of native and foreign-born workers if they both specialise in different types of goods.
The other two channels of adjustments that we need to consider when trying to isolate immigrant
demand are changes in housing density and changes in housing supply. Table 1 displays the total po-
pulation and the number of residential dwellings in the 50 provinces of study for every year between
2001 and 2012. The table shows the rate of total housing stock over total population. Housing density
21As discussed earlier, the native or foreign-born inflow is defined as the change in numbers during t while population
in t refers to the stock at the beginning of the year (January).
22In their report, Ferna´ndez-Huertas et al. (2009) provide some evidence on the relationship between immigration and
native location. They find positive correlations between 0.1 and 0.4, although they claim that this size is negligible and
cannot have any considerable impact on the estimation of local effects of immigration. They conclude that these results
show at least no-displacement of natives. Gonza´lez & Ortega (2013) also argue that native displacement would have no
impact on the area level estimates. My results in Section 3.3 suggest differently.
23See for example Card (2001); Hatton & Tani (2005); Card (2007); Saiz & Wachter (2011); Accetturo et al. (2014);
Ferna´ndez-Huertas et al. (2015). Despite this perception, there is still little evidence on significant displacement, at least in
the US Peri & Sparber (2011).
24Other papers that have found positive or non-negative impacts between immigration and native employment are
Basso & Peri (2015) and Beerli & Peri (2015).
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remained relatively stable during the period, increasing only 0.026 units in over 10 years25. These
numbers suggest that, if anything, intensive construction together with large immigrant inflows kept
the rate of houses/population relatively constant over the period. Given how stable average density
has remained over time we expect that either the province-specific attributes or the province-specific
fixed effect would be capturing anything correlated with housing cost growth and changes in hou-
sing density. Table 1 also shows that a large number of new housing units were constructed between
2001 and 2012, over 6 million (and in the census data almost 4 million of main homes between 2001
and 2011). We would expect that this substantial increase in supply would, at least partially, mitigate
the rise in prices caused by the increase in demand. House construction could also be correlated with
immigration inflows if immigrants locate in areas where house construction is higher (due to job
opportunities or more availability of housing).
[TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
I account for the effect of housing supply on house prices in two ways. Firstly, in the estimation
of (1) I include a large set of time-invariant province attributes related to housing supply (geography,
land regulation and housing market characteristics). As the model is estimated in first differences,
these variables control for differential trends correlated to both immigration inflow and house price
changes. However, if we want to isolate the impact of immigration on house prices via its demand
impact (e.g. keeping housing supply constant) we would need to include time-varying changes in
housing supply as an additional control variable. This variable would remove the bias arising from
the fact that immigrants might be locating in areas where construction is growing faster (to work in
this sector or due to higher availability of homes) and that house construction also affects housing
costs via increasing supply of housing units. Including time-varying supply changes in the estima-
tion of equation (1) as an additional control is very problematic, because even if lagged, housing con-
struction is a “bad” control given that construction is directly affected by immigration26. In Section
3.5, I include time-varying housing supply (log changes of stock of dwellings) and deal with the bad
control problem using an instrumental variables (IV) strategy. When I control for housing supply
changes, the estimated coefficient β captures only the total demand effect (instead of the the total
effect). Yet, including this control does not affect the main estimates, so I refer to the total demand
and total effect indistinctively in what follows.
Once we have considered the impact of native mobility and changes on supply conditions on the
total estimates, we need to design a method to isolate the impact of immigrant demand. Even conditi-
onal on supply changes, the total (demand) effect would be capturing the net change in demand from
foreign-born and natives. It has been argued that the impact of immigrant demand cannot be separa-
ted from other demand changes induced by native population adjustments (Saiz, 2007), affecting the
interpretation of the estimated elasticities27. To identify the variation in total population that arises
from immigrant inflows, I replace normalised immigration inflows in (1) by a normalised population
inflow variable28 and estimate the effect of changes in population using solely the variation which is
due to exogenous location of foreign-born (predicted by the instrument). I construct an instrument
to predict the location of immigrants based on past ethnic networks (details on its construction in
Section 2.2). I estimate the following specification:
∆ log (hpri,t) = β
(
∆POPi,t−1
POPi,t−2
)
+ φ′Zi + δ′∆Xi,t−2 + λt + γr/i + ε i,t (11)
In the results section I show that there is an empirical relationship between the β coefficients of
25If we examine differences in average dwelling occupancy using 2001 and 2011 Census data we find a similar picture.
26In particular because Gonza´lez & Ortega (2013) find that immigrants have a positive causal impact on housing con-
struction.
27“There is no way to separate the effect of increased housing demand (immigration) from the potential decreased demand associated
with potential native out-migration. Part of the local response to the treatment (immigration) can occur through native out-migration.
In this case, we need to be careful about the interpretation of the coefficient of immigration on rents.” (Saiz, 2007, pg. 348).
28Which in practice corresponds to the population growth rate.
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equations (1), (10) and (11). The following section derives the decomposition of the total (demand)
effect algebraically.
2.4 Decomposition of the effect of immigration on house prices
In this section I formalise a decomposition of the total impact into a direct immigrant demand effect
and an indirect demand effect (induced by the impact of immigrants on native location). As control-
ling for changes in housing supply does not impact the coefficients substantially (Section 3.5) we can
exclude the impact of housing supply in the discussion without loss of generality. The (simplified)
version of equations (1), (10) and (11) is29:
Total effect: ∆ log (hpri,t) = β1N∆FBi,t−1 + ... + e1i,t = β1N∆FBi,t−1 + θ
1
i,t (12)
Native mobility: N∆NATi,t−1 = β2N∆FBi,t−1 + ... + e2i,t = β2N∆FBi,t−1 + θ
2
i,t (13)
Immigrant demand: ∆ log (hpri,t) = β3N∆POPi,t−1 + ... + e3i,t = β3N∆POPi,t−1 + θ
3
i,t (14)
where log (hpri,t) stands for growth of housing costs (transaction or rents) in region i at time t and
N∆FBi,t−1 is the normalised change in foreign-born population (immigration inflow) in region i at
time t− 1 (similarly for natives NAT and total population POP). t corresponds to the period 2002–
2012. exi,t are the error terms in the different equations. In the main results ∆ corresponds to annual
differences, but the results of this section also hold for longer differences. I group all the controls,
area/time dummies and errors in terms θxi,t.
Note that at a point in time total population changes are just is the sum of foreign-born and
natives changes (all normalised):
N∆POPi,t−1 = N∆FBi,t−1 + N∆NATi,t−1 (15)
From equation (12) the total impact of immigration inflows on house prices is:
∂∆ log (hpri,t)
∂N∆FBi,t−1
= β1 (16)
Using (15) in equation (14) I obtain:
∆ log (hpri,t) = β3N∆POPi,t−1 + θ3i,t = β3 (N∆FBi,t−1 + N∆NATi,t−1) + θ
3
i,t (17)
If I replace N∆NATi,t−1 by equation (13) I get:
∆ log (hpri,t) = β3N∆FBi,t−1 + β3β2N∆FBi,t−1 + β3θ2i,t + θ
3
i,t (18)
When I differentiate (18) with respect to the immigration inflow I obtain:
∂∆ log (hpri,t)
∂N∆FBi,t−1
= β3 + β3β2 (19)
From equating (16) and (19) I obtain the following decomposition of the total effect:
β1 = β3 + β3β2 = β3 (1 + β2) (20)
This decomposition only holds if θ1i,t, θ
2
i,t and θ
3
i,t do not directly depend on N∆FBi,t−1 so their
partial derivatives in (16) and (18) are zero. In other words, (20) holds for consistently estimated
coefficients. Expression (20) shows that the total effect of immigration on housing costs β1 can be
decomposed into a direct immigrant demand effect (β3) and an indirect demand effect (β3β2). The
29Given that the same covariates are included in all three equations, to simplify exposition I do not include the controls
and fixed effects in the expressions.
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indirect demand effect is the product of the change in native population that happens due to the
immigrant inflow (β2) and the immigrant demand effect β3. Therefore β3 can be interpreted as a
”general demand” coefficient (elasticity of the prices with respect to changes in population) which in
our setting is estimated from an exogenous change in the foreign-born population (predicted by the
ethnic enclaves instrument).
If we ignore the impact that native mobility has on changing the total demand in the region via
its impact on natives mobility, we could assume that β1 and β3 are the same and that β1 corresponds
to the price-population elasticity. In reality, only the second coefficient corresponds to the this elas-
ticity, while the total (demand) impact includes changes in demand from the exogenous change in
population (from the immigrant inflow) and from endogenous change in (native) population. β3 is
theoretically unambiguously positive (for an inelastic normal good, an increase in demand should
push prices up), while the sign and size of β1 depends on the term (1 + β2), which captures the
impact of native mobility on additional changes in local demand. This term could be negative (if
immigrants displace natives more than one-to-one), positive but smaller than one (if immigrants dis-
place natives but not one-to-one), one (if immigrants have no impact on native mobility) or greater
than one (if immigrants and native co-locate). As discussed Saiz (2007), it is true that estimating β1 to
some extent is informative of the impact of immigration on native mobility. However, the interpre-
tation of this coefficient as a price-elasticity is not exact unless we have some information about β2.
The decomposition clarifies this issue and the results in this paper provide the first joint estimates
of all three effects (total, induced and immigration demand) in a relevant context. Expression (20)
formalises the main result of this paper and provides a framework for a better interpretation of the
reduced-form estimates available in the literature.
3 Results
3.1 Data and descriptive statistics
To carry out the empirical analysis I used data from multiple sources. Immigrant and population data
comes from the Municipal Register (Padro´n Municipal), which keeps an annual record of all registered
individuals in a municipality over time regardless of their legal immigration status. This is the most
reliable source to study the impact of the size of immigration on area economic outcomes. House
house price data was obtained from Uriel-Jime´nez et al. (2009), who provide an improved version of
the Housing Department Average Province House Price Index30. Data on rents was obtained combi-
ning data from the Housing Department and the National Institute of Statistics. Finally, data on the
controls comes from several sources including the National Institute of Statistics, the Housing De-
partment, the European Environmental Agency, the 2001 Census and the La Caixa Spanish Economic
Yearbook. Full details on the data sources are provided in Section A.1 in the Appendix. The full list
of controls is provided in the descriptive statistics table (Table A.1) and in the results table notes.
To investigate the impact of immigration on housing costs, I exploit a panel dataset for Spanish
provinces (NUTS3) for the period 2001-2012. The period of analysis is very suitable to study this
question because large immigration inflows were coupled with a period of housing sector boom
(2001–2007) followed by a bust (2008–2012). Figure 1 shows the evolution of immigrant stocks and
inflows and of housing costs during these years. Foreign-born stock increased from below 2 million
people in 2001 to over 6.7 million in 2012, an increase of almost 250%. In these years, the share of
foreign-born over total population rose almost 10 percentage points (from 4.8% to 14%). Between
2001 and 2008, the annual inflows of foreign-born were over 400,000 persons per year, and even
after the start of the recession they remained between 70 and 100,00031. At the same time until 2008,
30The Ministerio de Vivienda was absorbed by the Ministry of Public Works Ministerio de Fomento in 2010. The data is very
similar and I check the robustness of the results to using the Public Works data series in section 5.2.
31The three spikes in the inflows in figure 1(b) correspond to three events described in Bertoli et al. (2013): the 2000
law which allowed access to municipality public services when registered, the 2004 illegal immigration amnesty and the
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average local housing costs increased considerably, in particular house prices. As the bottom panels
of the figure show, during the housing boom years average house prices increased around 108%, and
even with the fall that followed, on average they increased almost 65% during the 2001–2012 period.
For rents, the increase was of around 37% between 2001 and 2012, around 30% until 2008. The annual
increase slowed down after 2008 but nevertheless remained slightly above 1%32.
[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]
Figure A.2 depicts maps with values of four variables for the 50 Spanish provinces. The different
colours represent the 5 quantiles of the values of the mapped variable. Map (a) depicts the spatial
distribution of foreign-born stocks in 2001 while map (b) depicts the distribution of the change in
the stocks between 2001 and 2012. We can see that at the beginning of the period of analysis the
immigrants where concentrated mostly on the Mediterranean coast, Madrid and Galicia 33, while
new immigrants settled in those areas around Madrid and Barcelona but also largely in Castilla and
Arago´n (in fact, if we look at the growth rates of foreign-born stocks, the largest ones are concentrated
around Madrid). Regarding the growth in housing costs, which are shown in maps (c) and (d), while
rents increased the most in Madrid and Barcelona and areas around them, house prices increased
the most in the South of Spain (Andalucı´a, Extremadura, Castilla-la-Mancha) and the periphery of
Barcelona. When put together, there is no clear spatial pattern connecting the location of immigrants
and housing cost growth so we need to turn to the regression analysis in order to be able to extract
meaningful conclusion.
3.2 Effect of immigration on house prices
Table 2 presents the ordinary-least-squares (OLS) results of the estimation of equation (1), for rents
(top panel) and for (transaction) house prices (bottom panel)34. As explained in section 2.3, in this case
β corresponds the total demand estimate and captures the combined impact of changes in demand
from immigrants and natives35. These results are obtained using data on annual changes on prices
during the period 2002-2012 and data on the immigration rate lagged one period (2001-2011). In all
specifications the standard errors are clustered at the province level and robust to heteroskedasticity.
I include time dummies to control for national shocks. Each column presents a specification that
includes different sets of controls and dummies. Specifications range from more to less demanding
in terms of data variation: OLS results (column 1) to first differences province fixed effects model
(column 8). The list of control variables is specified in table A.1 and in the notes of table 2, and it is
the same in all tables unless specified. Coefficient β is a semi-elasticity and it can be interpreted as
the growth of housing costs in percentage points for a 1 percentage point (0.01) increase in the rate.
[TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
The first column of Table 2 shows the results obtained when we only include year dummies. This
simple correlation is 0.34 for rents and 0.6 for house prices. In columns 2 to 7, I include time-varying
controls lagged two periods (2), region (NUTS2) dummies (3) and, subsequently, province location
and amenity attributes (4), province socio-economic attributes (5), province geography and land re-
accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in 2007. These policy changes cannot be used for identification in our context
as they were expected and some of them would only apply to particular nationalities in particular years. See Bertoli et al.
(2011) and Bertoli et al. (2013) for more discussion.
32Rents are based on the whole stock of properties available for renting (the already rented and the just rented), and
are tightly connected to national CPIs, so the scope for growth is smaller than in the case of house prices. Conversely, the
changes on house prices depend solely on new properties sold. Therefore, one can expect the increase on house prices to
be much more volatile than that of rents.
33This is partly due to residential migrants from rich EU countries, while most of the migrants after 2001 where economic
migrants from Latin America, the North of Africa and Eastern Europe.
34For presentation purposes, I do not report the coefficients for the control variables and the fixed effects.
35To the extent that the time-invariant house supply controls fully control for growth in supply. We will see in section 3.5
that controlling for time-varying housing supply changes does not substantially affect the estimates, conditional on all the
controls and fixed effects.
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gulation attributes (6) and province housing market attributes (7). All models have high explanatory
power (the R2 range between 60-70% for rents and is around 85% for prices). By adding controls,
the coefficient increases moderately for rents, and it doubles for house prices. Column 8 presents
the first-differences province fixed effect estimates. The coefficients are larger than in column 7, but
not statistically different. This suggests that the large set of province attributes capture almost all the
time-invariant province characteristics correlated with prices and immigration growth. In the last co-
lumn the estimated elasticities are around 0.46 for rents and for transaction is 1.2. These numbers are
smaller than those in Saiz (2007). Nevertheless, they just correspond to partial correlations between
prices and immigration growth.
In order to be able to make causal claims about the estimates, I implement the IV strategy explai-
ned in section 2.2. Table 3 presents the results using the instrument as defined in equation (9). This
table has the same structure as the previous one. The predicted stocks and inflows of foreign-born by
nationality used in the computation of IVmain N∆FBi,t−1 come from the gravity model estimation,
in particular from columns 1 and 5 in Table A.3. In these results, year 1991 is used as the base year for
the predicted location patterns of both natives and foreign-born. Time fixed effects are included in
all the specifications and the standard errors are clustered at the province level. The tables display a
test of the strength of the instruments (F-stat Kleibergen-Paap). As expected, in all specifications the
standard errors increase when using instrumental variables.
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
For both house prices and rents, the estimated coefficients of immigration inflows are larger than
in Table 2. This suggests that immigrants are moving, conditional on the controls and the area fixed
effects, to provinces which are experiencing negative shocks in the growth of rents, and therefore
the estimates of Table 2 are downward biased. Given that we are controlling for a wide set of time-
varying economic factors and time-invariant attributes, it is quite reasonable that, conditional on
all these controls, immigrants locate in places where housing is more affordable36. In addition, as
discussed above, the down-ward bias of the OLS estimates could be due to measurement error, either
due to poorly measured raw population register number or due to the fact that the total foreign-
born number masks substantial nationality-mix heterogeneity across provinces and the IV better
captures the average treatment effect. In all cases the instrument is strong. The Kleibergen-Paap F-
stat is always over 10 and above the Stock-Yogo critical values. The table also reports the first-stage
coefficients, that indicate that the shift-share instrument predicts approximately half of the actual
immigration rate (the R2 of the first-stage is also high, between 0.5 and 0.73%).
For rents, the estimates elasticity in column 7 is around 0.8 and the coefficient is insignificant
in column 8. The standard errors of both estimates are very similar but the coefficient decreases
substantially when province fixed effects are included. This specification is very demanding and,
given that rental price growth correlates highly with inflation, it is likely that the province fixed
effect absorb most of the variation in rental prices growth. As column 7 already includes a large set of
province attributes, I consider this specification almost as robust as that of column 8. In fact, for prices
the coefficients in the last two columns are practically the same. For house prices the elasticities range
between 2 (column 4) and 3.1 (column 8) and the coefficient is highly significant even in the most
demanding specification. As rents are insignificant in column 8, without loss of generality for house
prices, in the following sections I consider the results of column 7 for rents as the preferred estimates
and the ones from column 8 for house prices. Previous research has found estimates of positive sign
and similar magnitude. The coefficients for both house prices are very similar to existing IV estimated
elasticities, such as Saiz (2007) (who finds 0.9 for rents and 3.2 for prices), Degen & Fischer (2010) who
find 2.7 for Swiss prices, Gonza´lez & Ortega (2009) who find 3.2 for house prices and Ottaviano &
Peri (2007) who find 0.7 for rents and between 1–2 for prices.
36Gonza´lez & Ortega (2013) and Farre´ et al. (2011) find the same direction for the OLS-IV bias.
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3.3 Effect of immigration on native location
Section 2.3 discusses the issues related to the interpretation of the coefficient β when we do not
take into account natives mobility. If immigrants do not affect native location choices, conditional on
changes in supply37, β captures the effect of increased immigrant demand. However, if immigrants
have a substantial effect on native location decisions, the total β would be also affected by local
changes in native demand. Depending on the sign of the effect, the immigrant demand estimate
would be above or below the total one. In order to uncover if this is the case, the first step is to
study the relationship between natives and immigrant location decisions. In this section, I estimate
the causal relationship between native location and immigration inflows.
[TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of equation (10). Columns have the same structure as
tables 2 and 3, but now the top panel shows the OLS/FE results and the bottom panel shows the IV
results. The time period of analysis is now 2001–2011. The first-stage is exactly the same as in table
3. I find positive significant impacts of immigrant inflow on native inflow in all specifications, both
in the OLS and in the IV results. As before, when instrumenting the immigration rate, the coeffi-
cients increase substantially. My preferred estimates are those of columns 7 and 8. These estimates
predict that for each 100 immigrants locating in a given province in a given year, around 35 natives
locate in the same province. The IV results Table 4 control for endogenous co-location of natives and
immigrants and thus the effect of immigrants on native location can be interpreted as causal.
Finding substantial immigrant-native co-location is different from other estimates in the litera-
ture38. My findings however suggest that natives and immigrants are contemporaneously co-locating
in the same provinces. As discussed in section 2.3, immigrants and natives might be heterogeneous
in skills levels and tastes. Immigrants might be regarded as complementary to natives and thus po-
sitively affect their location decisions. Recently, the immigration impacts literature has focused in
the research of these complementarities (Ottaviano, 2014). Besides enhancing productivity through
improved task specialisation (Peri, 2012), immigrants might have desirable attributes for natives.
For example if immigrants are specializing in producing goods and services which are desirable for
natives (Ottaviano et al., 2013), increasing their consumption opportunities (Mazzolari & Neumark,
2012) or allowing female workers to increase their labour supply (Barone & Mocetti, 2011). In order
to provide a better understanding of the co-location finding, section 4 develops a simple theoretical
framework where natives and immigrants specialise in different sectors (high-skill natives in the tra-
dable sector and low-skill immigrants in the non-tradable local services sector)39. In the model, an
inflow of immigrants reduces the price of local services making locations more attractive to natives,
who co-locate with the immigrants.
In addition, Ferna´ndez-Huertas et al. (2009) find a comparable result for a long-differences esti-
mation from population growth regressed on the immigration rate for the period 2001-2008. Their
prediction is of 11 natives for each 100 immigrants. This number is similar to my OLS results. They
argue that this number is sufficiently small to have an impact on compensation or reinforcement
37In the results of Section 3.4, supply is already taken into account by including of time-invariant supply-related controls.
As shown in Section 3.5, when I directly include house construction, the coefficients remain unchanged. For this reason, in
the following I refer to the estimate that takes into account native mobility as the immigrant demand effect without loss of
generality.
38Most of the literature compares immigrants and natives which have comparable occupation or skill levels and thus
expecting displacement is more correct in this context.
39The data I use in this paper does not allow to perform the analysis on the impact of immigrants on native location by
skill level as for example in Mocetti & Porello (2010) and Wozniak & Murray (2012). The alternative source for immigration
data, the Spanish Labour Force Survey (“Encuesta de Poblacio´n Activa”), despite containing information on the education
level attained by workers aged 16 or more, does not provide information on immigrants by country of origin so the instru-
ment cannot be constructed. While it would be interesting to analyse this, the aim of the paper is different. With regards to
housing consumption, we could expect high and low skill immigrants to consume different type of housing. In my case,
the IV strategy captures the local average treatment effect, the average impact across skill groups, which is sufficient for
the purpose of the paper.
15
of the impact of immigration inflows on the housing or the labour markets40. I find the size of the
co-location to be substantially larger, suggesting that any demand impact of immigrants had on the
housing markets would be amplified by the arrival of natives. I investigate this possibility in the
following section.
3.4 Effect of immigration on house prices revisited
In this section I apply the methodology explained at the end of Section 2.3 to isolate the effect that
can be attributed to increases in immigration demand only. I use population growth rate as the main
regressor in equation (11) and instrument it with expression (9). The instrument predicts exogenous
foreign-born location, conditional on controls and fixed effects. By doing this, the instrumented po-
pulation growth variable used in the second stage only captures changes in population due to im-
migrant inflows and thus isolates the impact on house prices that stem from changes in foreign-born
demand. By doing this, the estimated coefficient corresponds to a direct demand (price-population)
elasticity. Given the strong immigrants-natives co-location result of the previous section, we expect
the parameter β to be smaller than the one found in table 3, because it would be only capturing the
effect of immigration through their effect on population changes.
[TABLE 5 AROUND HERE]
The results of using this strategy are presented in Table 5. The instrument is very strong in all
specifications, as shown in the test of weak identification row. My preferred specifications are those
of columns 7 and 8 which use the most demanding set of area fixed effects and province attributes.
The estimated elasticities in these columns are around 0.6 for rents and between 1.6 and 2.3 for house
prices41. The coefficients estimated in Table 5 are around 35% larger than those of table 3, in line with
the co-location effect estimated in the native mobility results in table 4. In fact, if we replace the esti-
mated coefficients in expression (20), we find that the additional demand from natives corresponds to
0.22 for rental prices and 0.79 for transaction prices, and that the decomposition is exact. This shows
that in our setting, beyond the immigrant demand impact, increased demand from natives had an
additional impact on house prices.
3.5 The role of housing supply
Depending on adjustment of housing supply, increases in housing demand following the immigrant
inflows would have different effects on house prices. In this section, I explore the role played by
housing supply on potentially mitigating the increase in prices42. In the previous results, the role of
changes in supply is already partially taken into account when I include province attributes related
to the changes in supply conditions (geography/land regulation and housing market characteristics)
or province fixed-effects. In this section, I directly investigate the mitigating impact that time-varying
supply changes might have on house prices by including the growth in the stock of dwellings as an
additional control variable. Here, I control for changes in housing supply in order to remove omitted
variable bias from the demand estimates. I am not interested on the specific estimated coefficient
of this variable but on the effect that introducing it has on the immigration and population rate
coefficients.
[TABLE 6 AROUND HERE]
The results are presented in Table 6. Columns 1–4 show the results for rents (specification with
40The difference in the results could be due to the fact that these authors do not use instrumental variables in their
estimation and they use long differences between 2001 and 2008, so they only have 52 observations. In fact, when they
perform the estimation at the municipality level, using over 8,000 observations, they find very similar estimates to mine.
41Gonza´lez & Ortega (2013) find an elasticity of around 0.98 using data from 2000-2008. Their specification and set of
controls and fixed effects are slightly different.
42This analysis applies mostly to the effect on house prices. The impact of housing construction on rents is less straight-
forward, even if dwellings must always be bought before they go to the rental market.
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region dummies and province attributes) and columns 5–8 for (transaction) prices (specification with
province fixed effects). The impact for the total demand (immigrant rate) is shown in the top panel
and for the immigrant demand (population rate) in the bottom panel. All the specifications instru-
ment the rate with the immigration shift-share instrument. Columns 1 and 5 present the baseline
specifications of tables 3 and 5 of columns 7 (rents) and 8 (prices). In columns 2 and 6 I add changes
in log housing stock (in t− 2) as an additional control variable. This coefficient is significant at 5%
level for rents on the top panel (total impact) but insignificant in the bottom one. It is always insigni-
ficant for house prices (and very close to zero). The coefficients remain very similar even if I remove
all the supply-related province attributes from the specifications.
Using the growth of housing stock as an additional control variable is highly problematic. Even
if lagged two periods with respect to the outcome variable, and one period with respect to the immi-
grant and population rates, this variable is likely to be endogenous. Unobservable province trends
could be affecting both the growth in prices and the construction of new housing units, particularly in
a context of housing market boom where there were expectations of high capital gains. As the results
in Gonza´lez & Ortega (2013) suggest, immigrants also have a direct impact on dwelling construction,
so the growth of housing stock is a “bad” control by definition43. To deal with this, I construct an
instrument for the stock of housing in a given province. I use a similar instrument as in Saiz (2010),
a shift-share type instrument for changes in housing stock. I construct a predicted stock of housing
combining the province national share of developable land in year 2000 (initial spatial distribution
– the share) and changes in total annual national stock (excluding the own province changes – the
shift44). The results are very similar if we use 1990 availability of developable land.
In columns 3/7 I use the predicted change in log housing stock IV as an additional control and
in 4/8 I use it to instrument for the time-varying change in housing supply. The housing-supply
IV is very strong (Kleinbergen-Paap values between 48-58). All along the coefficients of the impact
of the rates on housing costs remain very similar to the baseline estimates, particularly for house
prices. These results suggest that changes in housing supply did not have any major impacts on the
demand estimates (neither the total or the immigrant demand ones). We need to keep in mind that
there are already a large set of controls included in the specifications that are likely already capturing
a substantial share of the variation due to changes in housing supply. It is then not so surprising
to find insignificant coefficients in this variable. In addition, table 1 shows that, despite the level
of construction was very high during the period of analysis, it was coupled with such a high level
of population growth that the house per person rate remained almost unchanged during the period.
Even if many houses were constructed during this period, the population inflows were so substantial
that increases in supply did not decrease the pressure of demand on housing costs 45. Given that
controlling for housing supply does not seem to have any large effect on the baseline estimates, the
total effect and the total demand effect are the same in my data.
4 Theoretical Model
In this section I propose a simple spatial equilibrium model to explain the results presented in Section
3. I find that the total effect is larger than the immigrant demand because of increased induced de-
mand by relocated natives and that both effects are positive. While the literature largely assumes that
43Table A.6 in the Appendix shows the results of regressing the immigration rate or the population growth on change in
housing stock (columns 4 and 5 of the table) using my data. The coefficients are positive and significant, particularly for
the direct immigrant effect.
44I exclude the own province stock from the national stock for two reasons: to avoid using the exact figure I am trying
to instrument for in the calculation of the predicted stock and to have province-specific time variation that is not fully
collinear with the included time and province fixed effects.
45We could also argue for a limited effect of construction via a high number of non-occupied dwellings. According to
Census data, 15% of the housing stock was empty in 2001. Although there are no official statistics, in 2010 the govern-
ment recognised the existence of around between 700,000 empty houses, while non-official statistics quantify this number
between 1.7 and 3 millions in 2008 (at the peak of the boom) and at least 1.5 millions in 2010 (after the crisis started).
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natives would be displaced from a region where a large inflow of immigrants arrive, I find a strong
robust co-location effect. Recent theoretical and empirical developments have focused on analysing
the impact of immigrants on the labour markets from a general equilibrium approach where we take
into account the specialisation, skill-mix and technological changes that come about with immigrant
inflows (Lewis & Peri, 2015; Peri, 2016). Some authors have proposed models predicting positive
impacts of immigration on firm performance via production complementarities (Ottaviano & Peri,
2012b) and thus a native wage-enhancing effect of immigration. Existing theoretical models of the
impact of immigration on house prices allow for potential co-location of immigrants and natives if
some sort of complementarity (via production or consumption) exists (Saiz, 2007; Sa´, 2015).
The model proposed below is a special case of a general model with two type of workers: native
and foreign-born. When each type of worker specialises in one sector (tradable or non-tradable) and a
change in the conditions in the source country pushes immigrants to the receiving country, the model
predicts an increase on local rents and native and immigrant contemporaneous co-location. This
result is consistent with the empirical findings of the previous sections and with existing evidence
for Spain that native and workers specialise in different sectors (Amuedo-Dorantes & de la Rica,
2011; De la Rica et al., 2014) and that foreign-born workers provide cheaper local services (Gonza´lez
& Ortega, 2010; Farre´ et al., 2011). The model can be also be generalised to include a second tradable
good which is produced only with foreign-born labour, in which case the model predicts that an
inflow of immigrants increases rents, decrease native wages and crowds-out native labour in the
receiving region46.
4.1 Model Set-up
I present here a one-region (in our case province) model where a worsening in economic conditions
in the country of origin generates an inflow of immigrants into the region. This fits well with the
empirical instrumental variables strategy used in this paper where the inflow of immigrants is pre-
dicted using a push-factors gravity model (which captures the changes in conditions in origin) and
the specific number of immigrants that locate in a particular region depends on local factors. The
model is suitable for an immigration wave where immigrants move from their country of origin to a
specific region and not when they move within regions of the receiving country47.
In this set-up the spatial equilibrium for immigrants is determined by comparing the receiving
city conditions with those of the sending country. After the inflow of foreign-born population settles
in the region, how the wages, native population and rents (housing costs) react depends on whether
the foreign-born population is employed in the tradable sector or not. In the case presented in this
section foreign-born workers only work in the non-tradable services sector, while all the tradable
good is produced with native labour. This assumption generates model predictions which fit the
empirical results obtained above.
Let us assume a region r where two goods are produced, a tradable one C and a non-tradable
one S. The third good is non-tradable housing H, which is just an endowment. There are two types
of labour in the economy: native labour Ln and foreign-born labour L f . All the tradable good is
produced with native labour and all the non-tradable good is produced with foreign labour48. The
production functions of these goods are:
Yc = (Lnc )
α(Nc)1−α (21)
Ys = AsL
f
s (22)
46A full depiction of this model and its predictions is available upon request. The model could also be extended to add
the Ottaviano & Peri (2012a) set-up where natives with different levels of skills would specialise in different sectors and
the inflow of (low-skilled) immigrants would have differential effects on the wages and housing consumption decisions
for both types of natives (high and low skilled).
47Which was the case during the immigration wave in Spain during the 2000s.
48In here I discuss the tradable and non-tradable sector produced with native and foreign-born workers but we could
also think about a tradable high-skill and non-tradable low-skill sector where immigrants would provide low-skill labour.
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where Yc is the total production of good C, Ys is the total production of good S, Nc is the second
factor of production in the tradable good sector and α and (1− α) are the input shares in the Cobb-
Douglas tradable good production function. As is the non-tradable good specific productivity shifter
(exogenous).
Individuals, both foreign and natives, yield utility from the consumption of three goods: the tra-
dable good C, the non-tradable good S and housing H. The utility function is Cobb-Douglas and the
shares of consumption of the goods are β, γ and (1− β− γ):
u = cβsγh1−β−γ (23)
Natives earn wages wn and foreign-born workers earn (nominal) wages w f , and they have no ot-
her sources of income. Rents (housing costs) are denoted by pi. Prices of goods are given and denoted
by pc and ps. The endowments of the second production factor and of housing stock are denoted by
Nc and H. The outside-option level of utility for native and foreign-born workers are given by u and
u f . The relationship between the native and foreign-born baseline utility level is given by expression
(A.6) and discussed in section A.3.
The equilibrium of the economy is characterised by the following equations:
ZPC1: pc =
wn
α
(
Nc
Ln
)α−1
(24)
ZPC2: ps =
w f
As
(25)
MCC1: w f L f = γ
[
wnLn + w f L f + piH
]
(26)
MCC2: piH = (1− β− γ)
[
wnLn + w f L f + piH
]
(27)
SEC1: u =
wn
pαc p
γ
s pi1−β−γ
(28)
SEC2: u f =
w f
pαc p
γ
s pi1−β−γ
(29)
Equations (24) and (25) are the zero profit conditions (ZPC) for the tradable and non-tradable
goods C and S, and equations (26) and (27) are the market clearing conditions (MMC) for the non-
tradable goods S and H. Equations (28) and (29) define the spatial equilibrium conditions (SEC)
where the optimality conditions for the maximisation problem of consumption for natives n and
foreign-born workers f are equal to their outside-option level of utility u and u f .
By combining the MCC (26) and (27) we obtain:
w f L f =
γ
1− β− γpiH (30)
wnLn =
β
1− β− γpiH (31)
From the ZPC of the tradable sector (24) we derive the demand for native labour, decreasing in wn:
Ln =
[
pcα
wn
] 1
1−α
Nc (32)
By replacing (32) into (31) we obtain:
(pcα)
1
1−α Nc
w
α
1−α
n
=
β
1− β− γpiH (33)
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Using the SEC (28) and (29) into (33) we obtain:
(pcα)
1
1−α Nc(
u
u f
w f
) α
1−α
=
β
1− β− γpiH (34)
From the ZPC (25) and combining it with the SEC (29) we obtain:
w f =
[
pβc
Aγs
]
u
1
1−γ
f pi
1−β−γ
1−γ (35)
Combining equations (34) and (35) and solving for rents we have the following:
pi = Φ1u
− γα
(1−γ)(1−α)+α(1−β−γ)
f (36)
Finally, using equations (35) and (36) we can solve for the foreign-born workers wages w f :
w f =
[
Φ2u
(1−γ)(1−α)+(1−γ)α(1−α−β)
(1−γ)(1−α)+α(1−β−γ)
f
] 1
1−γ
(37)
where Φ1 and Φ2 are functions of prices, parameters and endowments.
4.2 Equilibrium adjustments to immigrants inflows
A decrease of the outside-option u f for the foreign-born workers has the following effects:
⇓ u f −→ ⇓ w f (equation 37)
⇓ u f −→ ⇑ pi (equation 36)
⇑ pi −→ ⇓ wn (equation 33)
⇓ wn −→ ⇑ Ln (equation 32)
⇓ w f ⇑ pi −→ ⇑ L f (equation 30)
Intuitively, a worsening in the (economic) conditions in the countries of origin of the foreign-born
workers decreases the value of their outside option (u f ) and workers would migrate to the region.
For a given housing stock and housing quality, housing rents pi increase. Equation (36) predicts that
the increase in foreign-born population decreases nominal wages w f and thus make the non-tradable
services cheaper (ZPC 25). Foreign-born workers would be willing to work in the region for lower
real wages. They enter the region until (equation 29) is in equilibrium.
The decrease in the price of local services makes the region more desirable for natives, who enter
the region until (equation 28) is in equilibrium again. This in turn increases rents even further and
decreases native nominal wages49. However, the real wages of natives are unchanged as local non-
tradable prices have become cheaper after the foreign-born inflow. In the new equilibrium the region
has increased foreign-born and native population, higher rents and lower nominal wages for natives
and foreign-born50. The real wages for natives are the same or higher than before (depending on
how much immigrants decrease local service prices and what share are these on the consumption
49In the long run housing supply can change, either directly with the construction of new dwellings, or indirectly by
increasing the density inside the dwellings (quality of housing can also be affected as noted by Saiz & Wachter (2011)).
To make the model more intuitive we assume that housing stock is fixed. In the empirical exercise the results suggest
that conditioning out for changes in housing supply does not change the demand impact of immigration on prices so this
assumption is compatible with the empirical framework.
50Which are not necessarily the same as they work in different sectors and their level depends on parameter values.
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of natives). Appendix Section A.3 presents a brief model extension to explain why immigrants of
different origins might locate in provinces in different proportions, providing a theoretical micro-
foundation for the use of the ethnic networks shift-share instrument.
5 Robustness
5.1 IV strategy validity discussion
In this section I discuss the validity of the instrumental variables strategy implemented in the results
section. Two conditions must apply for the shift-share prediction to be an appropriate instrument.
For the exclusion restriction to be valid, conditional on all controls, the only channel through which
the predicted immigrant stocks affect the housing costs growth has to be via its effect on current im-
migrant stocks (by nationality). This implies that historical settlement of immigrants by nationality
in the base year has to be sufficiently lagged that, conditional on controls, it is orthogonal to unobser-
vables correlated with current housing costs growth (exogeneity). At the same time, the instrument
has to be sufficiently strong in its prediction of the current immigrant location patterns (relevance). I
provide two pieces of evidence to test these conditions. The first one relates to the exogeneity of the
instrument and the second one, to its relevance.
My base year, 1991, is 10 years before my observation period starts, which is substantially longer
than in other applications51. However, one could still think of unobservable shocks correlated with
housing costs and location decision of immigrants that existed in 1991 that still affect both aggregates
today (even conditional on all the region trends and province attributes/fixed effects). To test this,
similarly to Farre´ et al. (2011)52, I regress the provincial share of foreign-born population in 1991 on
the 1990-91 economic conditions and then the change in this share during my observation period
(2001-2012) on these same variables. The aim of this exercise is to show that the determinants of the
geographical distribution of the mass of foreign-born workers in 1991 does not perfectly predict the
location during my period of study. The results are shown in table 7.
[TABLE 7 AROUND HERE]
The regression includes the 50 provinces observations and a constant, so all the values are relative
to the national mean. I include the log of disposable income, the log of average wage (region wage
bill over workers), the share of different sectors (agriculture, services and industry) in the regional
value-added (the exclude category is the construction sector), the unemployment rate for natives and
foreign-born workers, the log housing density (number of residential housing units over area) and
the share of built-up land over total land (to control for urbanisation). The model has high predictive
power (R2 is around 0.75) and most of the regressors are significant. When I regress this same set
of variables on the change of foreign-born over population over the 2001-2012 period none of the
coefficients is significantly different from zero. This test is supportive of the appropriateness of using
1991 as base year. In fact, the empirical exercise is even more demanding because most of these 1991
conditions would be captured in the region and province attributes/fixed effects. In case we consider
1991 still to close to the start of the period, in the robustness checks provided in the next section I also
use 1985 and 1981 as based years to construct the instrument (which remains strong) and the results
remain fairly similar.
The second exercise is to construct instruments with placebo shifts or placebo shares and combine
them with the actual share or shifts (the ones used in the construction of the instrument of section
3). We use these placebo instruments to check if the results hold. This test relates to the relevance of
the instrument. The purpose of this is to prove that it is the exact combination of the (nationality-
specific) 1991 location patterns and the gravity predicted national inflow that produces a reliable
51For example Saiz (2007) uses data from 1985–1998 and the base year is 1983 and Sa´ (2015) uses data from 2003 and the
base year is 2001.
52These authors use a very similar instrument and an extensive discussion on the appropriateness of this instrument
(relevance and exogeneity) is available in their paper.
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strong instrument. I show the results of this exercise in table 8. The top panel shows the results for
rents and the bottom one for house prices. I only show the results for the immigrant demand results,
but the insignificance of the placebo instruments is the same for the total demand results. The first
column shows the baseline estimates, which uses the instrument where the share is based on the
1991 provincial foreign-born stocks by nationality and the shift is based on the gravity estimates of
columns 1 and 5 of table A.3.
[TABLE 8 AROUND HERE]
In the first three columns I change the province share and interact it with the gravity national
prediction (baseline shift). In column 2 I randomly distribute each nationality immigrants across
provinces and I multiply this random allocation by the gravity-model predicted annual inflow by
nationality. In column 3 I use nationality-province immigrant stock information from the 1930 census.
This shows that such older past location patters do not have any predictive power for the current
ones. In column 4 I use a land-use share based on data from the Corine 2000 dataset. I calculate the
share of forest land (column 3) in the province with respect to the total in that category in the whole
of Spain and use that share to distribute the national inflow and stock of immigrants. None of the
coefficients for the population rate are significantly different from zero. In the remaining columns
I use the 1991 location patterns and change the component of the instrument that provides time
variation (the shift).
In the last four columns of the table I use the 1991 share (baseline share) and interact it with a
placebo annual shift. In columns 5 to 7 I use the immigrants by nationality (inflow and stock) going
to different OECD countries during the study time period (2001-2011). I use the inflows to the USA
(column 5), to Australia and New Zealand (column 6) and to Japan (column 7). The coefficients for
the population rate regressor are highly insignificant. Finally, in column 8 I use the annual growth in
province population predicted by the natural movement of population (births-deaths). I do not want
to use internal (native) migration driven population changes as we have seen in section 3.3 they are
causally related to the immigrant inflows. The coefficient of interest is also highly insignificant. These
results show that is it precisely the combination of a relevant share and a relevant shift that gives raise
to a strong instrument that predicts the annual location of immigrations by nationality in each of the
provinces.
5.2 Additional results
In this section, I present additional results in order to check the robustness of the findings. I present
the most of the alternative estimates using the population rate regressor (immigrant demand) but the
results are also robust for the total demand estimates. As no substantial effect of controlling for time-
varying housing supply was found, I compare the results with the baseline estimates of columns
7 and 8 of table 5, e.g. 0.61 for rents and 2.28 for house prices. The results for rents are displayed in
table 9 and for house prices in table 10. Column 1 top panel in both tables shows the baseline elasticity
estimate. Note that the Kleibergen-Paap statistics are not the same in both tables because for rents I
include NUTS2 dummies and province attributes and for prices I include NUTS3 dummies.
[TABLES 9 and 10 AROUND HERE]
The top panel of tables 9 and 10 changes the shift used in the construction of the instrument of
expression (9). In the baseline results we use the gravity predicted annual inflow with country and
year fixed effects (column 1 and 5 in table A.3). In columns 2 and 3 I use the actual annual inflow
to Spain by nationality, including (2) and excluding (3) the own province value. The coefficients are
similar but slightly larger than in the baseline estimates. In columns 4 to 6 I use predicted national
immigration totals from different specifications of the gravity model that vary in the inclusion of
different sets of area and year dummies. I check the robustness to including country dummies but
excluding year dummies (4), to using nationality group and year dummies (5) and to only use nati-
onality group dummies (6). The results only hold in column when we use country dummies for the
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estimates, and the instruments become too weak otherwise.
In columns 1 to 3 of the middle panel of these tables I check the robustness of the results to
changing the base year used to distribute the national immigrant inflow across provinces based on
historic ethnic settlements. The baseline results use immigrant stocks by province and nationality in
1991, using 104 different nationalities. In column 1 I use 113 nationalities and the census 2001 location
patterns and, as expected, the instrument is very strong and the coefficients decrease with respect to
the baseline estimates. However, it is unlikely that 2001 settlements are unrelated to 2001-2012 shocks
even conditional on controls. In columns 2 and 3 I use data from 1985 (Annual Statistical Yearbook)
–62 nationalities– and 1981 (Census) – 74 nationalities– to construct the share. The results are not
robust for rents but for prices they remain significant and the coefficient is quite similar when using
1981 census data. In columns 4 to 6 of the middle panel I add additional area controls. In column 4 I
add NUTS1 linear trends, in column 5 NUTS1*year dummies and in column 6 NUTS2 linear trends.
The results remain very similar.
In the bottom panel I carry out two additional exercises. In columns 1-3, I change the denomina-
tor used in the construction of instrument (9). In the baseline results to compute the imputed initial
population figures I use the native imputed stock using 1991 location patterns (constructed as ex-
plained in section A.2.2 in the Appendix) and the gravity-model immigration stock. In here I use
either the actual population of the province (1), the actual natives combined with the imputed im-
migrant stock population (2) or the imputed immigrant stock and the imputed native stock using
1981 census data (3). The results are fairly robust for rents and very robust for house prices. In the
last 3 columns of the bottom panels, I use an alternative instrument based on the gateways/ports of
entry53. The intuition is that different nationality immigrants will locate disproportionably in regi-
ons which are more accessible to them. I first locate 50 ports of entry using 6 different travel modes
(listed in table A.4). For 113 nationalities I calculate the share of immigrants in 2000 that used those
different modes of transportation using data from the National Immigrant Survey 2007. This gives
me nationality-specific variation which is necessary in order to avoid perfect collinearity with the
province attributes and fixed effects of specification (1). Then, for each province in Spain I calculate a
weighted-by-road-distance and port size (using data on air and boat passengers in 2001) nationality-
specific accessibility index. I calculate a weighted measure of how accessible a province is for each
nationality from all the ports of entry, where the numerator is the port-size and the denominator is
share of migrants that use that particular mode. I normalise this province accessibility measure and
use it to distribute the nationality-specific gravity-model inflow/stock in every year 2001 to 2011.
Unfortunately as shown in column 4, in my setting this instrument is very weak (the Kleinbergen-
Paap statistic is very low). However, I can use this gateways-based share to construct a second in-
strument with completely different sources of variation than the one used for the baseline results.
This allows me to run Hansen exogeneity test54. The results of using these additional instruments
are presented in columns 5 and 6 of the bottom panel. For the second instrument I use the gateways
accessibility shares and for the shifts I use the number of immigrants going to countries with simi-
lar economic and amenity characteristics as Spain (EU15 South European countries –column 5– or
Portugal-Greece-Italy –column 6–). The columns show the combined instruments F-test which is in
both cases over 10 and the coefficients of both instruments in the first stage. The results are very si-
milar to the baseline ones and more importantly, the exogeneity of instruments Hansen test statistics
is well above 0.05.
Tables A.5 to A.8 in the Appendix provide additional results55. For comparability all tables repro-
duce the baseline estimates for house prices and rents. Table A.5 checks the robustness of estimates
to using alternative population measures. The first four columns show results for the total effect and
53In a similar manner to Gonza´lez & Ortega (2013).
54The Hansen test cannot be run using a second instrument based on the same sources of variation, either the shift or the
share, as this would just be a very similar version of the same instrument and not genuinely an additional one.
55In unreported results, I also check if the results hold when I remove the 2 and 3 largest and smallest provinces in terms
of initial stock and shares of foreign-born, and they do.
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the last found for the immigrant effect. Column 2 uses working-age foreign-born population, column
3 foreign population and column 4 working-age foreign population. The coefficients are smaller but
similar to the baseline estimate of column 1. Column 6 shows the results using the working-age total
population. As expected, the estimates using a sub-population group are smaller but similar to the
baseline of column 5.
In table A.6 I use alternative outcomes. In columns 2 and 3 I use quarterly house price data from
the Spanish Public Works Department data (“Ministerio de Fomento”) (the annual average and the se-
cond quarter average). The results are practically unchanged with respect to the baseline estimate of
column 1. In columns 4 and 5 I show the results using the log change in housing stock as the outcome
variables (using the NUTS2 dummies/province attributes NUTS3 dummies). I find a coefficient of
around 0.9 significant at 10% level for the total effect and of around 0.7 and significant at 5% for the
immigrant effect. These results, in line with existing findings, suggests that the immigrant inflow was
also responsible for the construction of housing units.
5.3 Timing of the adjustments
In this section, I explore the timing of the adjustments for all three sets of results. In Table A.7, instead
of one-year differences as in the main results, I use five-year long-differences (LD) to construct the
immigration and population rates and the instrument. The outcome variables also correspond to 5-
year growth rates. There are two main changes in the estimated specification. First, because the LD
setting allows for the adjustments in prices from the inflows to take place at any time during the 5-
year time period, I do not impose any lag structure in the specification. Therefore, in these results the
long-difference changes in the outcomes and main regressors are contemporaneous. Secondly, given
that I only have 100 observations in the data (2011/06 and 2006/01 differences), I cannot use all the
controls and area dummies as in the FD results without losing all the variation in the data. However,
I still include a large set of controls which are listed in the notes of the table. The results of this table
show that the main results hold when allowing for longer periods for the adjustments to take place.
The instrument is still strong and the Kleinbergen-Paap statistics well above the 10 rule-of-thumb
threshold. The coefficient for native mobility is very similar to those estimated using FD. The total and
immigrant demand effects are larger for rents and smaller for prices, but similar and not statistically
different from the FD estimates. If we use the coefficients of Table A.7, the decomposition expression
(20) is still valid. The findings of this exercise show that, similarly to Saiz (2007), the estimates in the
LD set up are consistent with the FD results and, more importantly, the decomposition of the total
impact into a direct and indirect demand effect still holds when we change the periodicity of the
adjustments. This
I perform a second exercise to study the timing of the adjustments. The results are shown in Table
A.8. Here, I test the robustness of the results to using a contemporaneous, one lagged or two-lagged
inflow of immigrants, using them one at a time or combined. I present the results for the immigrant
effect. There are three panels in the table: the top one is for rents, the middle one for house (tran-
saction) prices and the bottom one for native mobility. The baseline results correspond to column 2
for rents and prices and to column 1 for native mobility. Column 1 shows the coefficient using the
contemporaneous rates: the results on rents remain significant and very similar to the baseline, but
they are insignificant (and quite imprecise) for prices. This result is reasonable given that one would
expect some lag of time between arriving into the country and investing in a property56. The main
results for prices are show in column 2. When I add a second lag in column 3, both coefficients are
weakly significant for rents but just the first lag remains significant for house prices. In column 4 I
add the contemporaneous rate to the lagged one, and in column 5 I add both the contemporaneous
56This could not be the case for some immigrant nationalities like EU15 immigrants from Germany or the UK who
migrate to Spain for retirement and to buy property. However, I do not consider residential-retiree immigration to be a
large phenomenon during the period of study. As discussed in De la Rica et al. (2014) most of the immigration during the
study period came for working reasons. Moreover, as seen in table A.5, the coefficients are very similar (a bit smaller) if we
focus on working-age population which excludes retirement immigrants.
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and the second lag. In these two columns, it is always the value in t− 1 which causally affects prices
in t. With respects to native mobility, the results of the bottom panel show that it is always the con-
temporaneous rate that influences changes in native location. These results suggest that my chosen
specifications are those that best capture the timing of the effects.
6 Conclusions
This paper draws the attention to a highly overlooked issue in the estimation of average area effects
of immigration: the role of local population displacement on the adjustment of local demand and
prices. The total impact of increases of foreign-born population on housing markets results from a
combination of their impact on housing demand, their impact on native mobility and their impact on
housing supply. The estimation of well-identified reduced-form effects is with no doubt of interest for
policy makers. However, previous research has shown the importance of taking into account the role
of (population) displacement when estimating the impact of local policy interventions (Blundell et al.,
2004; Einio & Overman, 2016). As well as the net impact, we might be interested on understanding
the mechanisms driving the total adjustment. This is the first paper that provides joint estimates of
the total price impact of immigration and of all its components and, in doing so, provides a better
understanding of the impact of changes in population on local house prices. I use Spanish data during
a housing boom and bust and a period of unprecedented immigration inflows to obtain my results.
In his seminal paper on the effect of immigration on house prices Saiz (2007) argues that there
is no way to separate the estimate of increased housing demand from immigrants from additional
changes in demand associated with changes in (local) native population. I this paper, I propose a met-
hodology to precisely identify this coefficient. I do this in three steps. I first estimate the total impact
of immigration on house prices using a specification similar to his, which corresponds to the total
net impact. To obtain consistent estimated elasticities I use a first-differences instrumental-variables
strategy. The specifications control for housing supply conditions in order for the coefficients to cap-
ture demand changes. In my preferred results, the elasticities are 0.8 for rental prices and 3.1 for
house (transaction) prices. In order to identify the potential wedge between the total and immigrant
demand estimates, I then estimate the impact of immigration on native mobility. I find a robust si-
zeable co-location effect of around 35 natives for 100 immigrants. Finally, I propose a strategy to pin
down the direct impact of immigrant demand on housing costs. I use population growth as the main
regressor and instrument it with a prediction of the immigration inflows and stocks based on exoge-
nous variation. This allows me to exploit only the variation in population growth which stems from
immigration. The estimated elasticities are 35% smaller than the total estimates (0.6 for rents and 2.3
for prices).
A formal decomposition of the total (demand) impact obtained from combining the estimating
equations is presented in the paper. Total changes in demand are the net result of direct demand
changes (price-population elasticity) plus any additional changes in demand from relocated popu-
lation. The sign of the second component depends on the impact of immigrants on native location
decisions. I show that this decomposition holds exactly when I use my consistent estimates. Additi-
onal demand from relocated natives increases the direct demand effect in 0.2 percentage points for
rents and 0.8 percentage points for prices, around 25% of the total effect. In order to explain the me-
chanisms driving the empirical results I propose a simple spatial equilibrium model. My results are
robust to changes in the construction of the instrument and to using longer lags in the calculation of
the time differences.
During the period of analysis, 2001 to 2012, the total growth of house prices was around 52% and
for rents of around 31%. The cumulated change in the immigration rate during the period was of
around 8.8%. If we use the estimated elasticities from Section 3, the predicted average total effect of
the change in immigration rate on house prices is of around 27 percentage points (pp) and of around
7.4 pp for rents. These numbers imply that immigration was responsible for an important share of the
actual housing cost growth, especially for prices (52% for prices and 24% for rents). Around a third
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of the effect can be attributed to additional changes in demand from relocated population. In order to
contextualise the magnitude of the effects, if we were to give the province with the smallest change
in immigration rate (Ca´ceres, 1.7%) the growth of the province with the largest rate (Guadalajara,
19.3%), it would have experienced an additional increase in rents and prices of 15 and 54 pp with
respect to its actual predicted change (1.4 and 5 pp).
My results highlight the importance of using a correct framework to interpret the coefficients.
Equation (20) shows that the net sign of the total effect is the results of direct demand impacts (which
we expect to be positive) and induced demand changes. These changes can be positive or negative
depending on the relationship between immigrant and native location decisions. When we only es-
timate the total effect and make claims about the sign of the second term of the decomposition, we
could be misinterpreting the mechanisms driving the total adjustments. Local outcomes would be
differently affected by immigration inflows depending on the size and sign of the native-immigrant
location. Displacement effects can also be relevant in other contexts such as the estimation of immi-
grants on local crime rates (Buonanno et al., 2011; Alonso-Borrego et al., 2012; Bell et al., 2013). By
disentangling the different channels through which immigration affects house prices, I provide not
only the size of the causal effect but also a meaningful economic interpretation of the estimates. A
correct understanding of the channels driving the total impact is essential for better policy design.
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Figures and tables
Figure 1: Immigrantion and house prices over time
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Table 1: Residential density in Spain 2001-2012
Year Population Housing stock Stock overpopulation
2001 40,972,359 20,988,378 0.512
2002 41,692,558 21,440,413 0.514
2003 42,573,670 21,878,187 0.514
2004 43,055,014 22,368,785 0.520
2005 43,967,766 22,877,640 0.520
2006 44,566,232 23,443,569 0.526
2007 45,054,694 23,983,886 0.532
2008 46,008,985 24,518,341 0.533
2009 46,593,673 24,856,498 0.533
2010 46,864,418 25,054,029 0.535
2011 47,029,641 25,196,069 0.536
2012 47,100,501 25,328,848 0.538
Source: Department of Housing and Population Registers
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Table 2: Total effect estimates – OLS/FE results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Change in log rents in t
Immigration rate (t-1) 0.340*** 0.289** 0.308*** 0.455*** 0.487*** 0.464*** 0.461*** 0.467***
[0.127] [0.119] [0.109] [0.105] [0.113] [0.112] [0.113] [0.113]
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.68
Change in log prices in t
Immigration rate (t-1) 0.604** 0.540* 0.697** 0.862*** 1.188*** 1.232*** 1.241*** 1.249***
[0.285] [0.292] [0.314] [0.293] [0.321] [0.336] [0.336] [0.337]
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550
Year dummies 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Time-var controls (t-2) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Area dummies NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS3
Location/Amenities 4 4 4 4
Socio-economic 4 4 4
Geography/Regulation 4 4
Housing Market 4
Notes: Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. t=2002/2012. Clustered (province) standard errors in brackets. NUTS2
corresponds to regions (CCAA) and NUTS3 corresponds to provinces. The dependent variable is the change in log province house
rents (top panel) and in house prices (bottom panel), between t/t-1. The immigration rate corresponds to the inflow of foreign-born
population in t-1 over population at the beginning of t-1/end of t-2. Time-varying controls (lagged two periods t-2/t-3) include change
in log GDP per capita, change in log number of credit establishments, change in share of saving banks, change in unemployment
rate, change in log average wage, change in average years of education (employed), change in proportion of WAP with no studies,
change in log urban infrastructure capital, change in log transport infrastructure capital, change in share employed in primary sector,
change in share employed in secondary sector, change in share employed in non-tradable services and change in share employed in
tradable services. Location/Amenities attributes include coast dummy, length of coastline, log of average temperature in January, log of
average rain precipitation in January, log distance to Madrid, log distance to Barcelona, log of total area, log of area of natural parks, log
number of retails shops, log number of restaurants and bars, index of the importance of the tourism sector and log number of doctors
(all in 2000). Socio-Economic attributes include log of population, share of foreign-born population, employment rate of foreign-born
population, share of single person households, average household size, share of households with children (socio-economic attributes
- all in 2001). Geography/Regulation attributes include share of developable land in 2000, average terrain ruggedness index, average
terrain height index, altitude range (max-min), number of localities with 10,000 inhabitants in 2000, share of population living in cities
with 50,000+ inhabitants in 2000, share of municipalities with a comprehensive planning law in 1999, share of municipalities with no
planning law in 1999, share of population living in towns with a right-wing party major in 2001. Housing market attributes include share
of population who rent, share of secondary family homes, share of empty family homes (all in 2001).
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Table 3: Total effect estimates – IV results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Change in log rents in t
Immigration rate (t-1) 0.683** 0.620* 0.838** 0.734** 0.947** 0.852** 0.834** 0.509
[0.290] [0.350] [0.393] [0.369] [0.470] [0.411] [0.406] [0.379]
Change in log prices in t
Immigration rate (t-1) -0.320 -1.080 0.823 2.044** 3.046** 3.024*** 3.045*** 3.073***
[0.696] [1.052] [0.758] [0.924] [1.214] [1.173] [1.175] [1.170]
First-Stage: Immigration rate in t-1
Immigration rate IV (t-1) 0.553*** 0.429*** 0.431*** 0.470*** 0.431*** 0.481*** 0.480*** 0.502***
[0.113] [0.106] [0.082] [0.092] [0.100] [0.109] [0.109] [0.114]
FS Adjusted R2 0.47 0.53 0.65 0.70 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73
Test weak identification 23.11 15.40 24.91 22.94 16.37 16.64 16.47 18.05
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550
Year dummies 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Time-var controls (t-2) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Area dummies NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS3
Location/Amenities 4 4 4 4
Socio-economic 4 4 4
Geography/Regulation 4 4
Housing Market 4
Notes: Controls and specification as in Table 2.
Table 4: Native mobility test – OLS and IV results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Native rate in t - OLS/FE
Immigration rate (t-1) 0.468*** 0.376*** 0.280*** 0.252*** 0.187*** 0.163*** 0.168*** 0.172***
[0.088] [0.078] [0.065] [0.040] [0.038] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036]
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.36 0.57 0.75 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.87
Native rate in t - IV
Immigration rate (t-1) 0.534*** 0.272 0.391*** 0.284** 0.354*** 0.324*** 0.353*** 0.346***
[0.164] [0.201] [0.144] [0.135] [0.134] [0.122] [0.126] [0.122]
Test weak identification 23.11 15.40 24.91 22.94 16.37 16.64 16.47 18.05
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550
Year dummies 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Time-var controls (t-2) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Area dummies NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS3
Location/Amenities 4 4 4 4
Socio-economic 4 4 4
Geography/Regulation 4 4
Housing Market 4
Notes: Controls in Table 2, except that now t=2001/2011. First-stage coefficients are the same as in Table 3.
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Table 5: Immigrant demand effect estimates – IV results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Change in log rents in t
Population rate (t-1) 0.445** 0.487* 0.602** 0.571** 0.699** 0.643** 0.616** 0.378
[0.173] [0.257] [0.268] [0.277] [0.332] [0.291] [0.279] [0.273]
Change in log prices in t
Population rate (t-1) -0.209 -0.849 0.591 1.592** 2.249*** 2.284*** 2.251*** 2.284***
[0.464] [0.902] [0.547] [0.679] [0.830] [0.799] [0.778] [0.780]
First-Stage: Population rate in t-1
Immigration rate IV (t-1) 0.848*** 0.546*** 0.600*** 0.604*** 0.584*** 0.637*** 0.649*** 0.675***
[0.157] [0.166] [0.115] [0.111] [0.118] [0.121] [0.122] [0.129]
F-Stage Adjusted R2 0.34 0.45 0.65 0.72 0.77 0.80 0.81 0.81
Test weak identification 28.22 10.17 24.77 26.13 21.58 23.92 24.23 25.89
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550
Year dummies 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Time-var controls (t-2) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Area dummies NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS3
Location/Amenities 4 4 4 4
Socio-economic 4 4 4
Geography/Regulation 4 4
Housing Market 4
Notes: Controls as in Table 2 but now the population rate is the inflow in population during t-1 over the original province population at
the beginning of t-1 (population growth rate).
Table 6: Effect of controlling for housing supply on the estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Change in log rents in t Change in log prices in t
Immigration rate (t-1) 0.834** 0.642* 0.704* 0.668* 3.073*** 3.085*** 3.036*** 3.021***
[0.406] [0.371] [0.372] [0.370] [1.170] [1.150] [1.069] [1.120]
Log change housing stock (t-2) 0.143** 0.118 -0.012 0.052
[0.071] [0.075] [0.627] [0.818]
Log change housing stock IV (t-2) -3.409* -1.508
[1.951] [23.833]
Test weak-identification IMMR 16.47 16.66 17.06 19.81 18.05 19.19 19.9 23.9
Test weak-identification HOUS 51.61 57.48
Change in log rents in t Change in log prices in t
Population rate (t-1) 0.616** 0.505* 0.548* 0.527* 2.284*** 2.324*** 2.285*** 2.285***
[0.279] [0.286] [0.282] [0.284] [0.780] [0.803] [0.763] [0.829]
Log change housing stock (t-2) 0.119 0.091 -0.054 -0.002
[0.077] [0.083] [0.629] [0.841]
Log change housing stock IV (t-2) -2.594 0.067
[2.210] [24.423]
Test weak-identification IMMR 24.23 21.68 22.53 24.75 25.89 26.47 27.74 30.02
Test weak-identification HOUS 45.58 53.34
Area dummies NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3
All province attributes 4 4 4 4
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550
Notes: Columns 1–4 include all the province attributes as in Table 2. Columns 5–8 include NUTS3 fixed effects instead. All columns
include time-varying controls and time fixed effects. When using the housing supply IV the share of developable land is removed from
the province attributes.
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Table 7: IV validity checks: Base-year validity regressions
(1) (2)
Share of FB Change share FB
in 1991 2001-2012
Log disposable income -0.007** -0.001
[0.003] [0.011]
Log of average wage -0.039** -0.069
[0.016] [0.064]
Share of agriculture in VA -0.284*** 0.397
[0.095] [0.423]
Share of services in VA -0.111 0.458
[0.079] [0.332]
Share of industry in VA -0.161** 0.403
[0.075] [0.293]
Natives unemployment rate -0.02 -0.19
[0.024] [0.146]
Immigrants unemployment rate -0.080** -0.173
[0.031] [0.156]
Log housing density 0.016*** 0.005
[0.003] [0.014]
Share of built-up land over total -0.293** 0.223
[0.127] [0.398]
Constant 0.520*** 0.306
[0.155] [0.679]
Observations 50 50
Model F-test 11.57 6.63
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.38
Notes: Source data: Census 1991, Spanish Regional Accounts, Corine Landcover 1990.
VA stands for Value Added. Economic values in 1991, share of build-up land in 1990.
The omitted category is share of construction in VA.
Table 8: IV validity checks: Placebo shift-share instrument results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline Different Shares & gravity Census 1991 & different Shifts
c91&grav random c1930 forest USA AUS&NZ JPN NATU GR
Change in log rents in t
Population rate (t-1) 0.616** 1.833 -1.175 2.779 0.657 -0.061 1.564 0.307
[0.279] [1.828] [2.225] [2.840] [1.930] [0.399] [1.224] [0.857]
Test weak identification 24.23 1.57 0.38 1.15 0.57 2.98 0.93 7.49
Area dummies NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2
All province attributes 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Change in log prices in t
Population rate (t-1) 2.284*** 9.556 4.473 7.6 10.559 2.394 3.854 -0.537
[0.780] [5.813] [8.925] [5.944] [11.221] [2.637] [5.354] [3.343]
Test weak identification 25.89 1.68 0.37 1.09 0.98 3.12 1.07 6.83
Area dummies NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550 550 550
Notes: Top panel results include NUTS2 dummies and all province attributes as in Table 2. Bottom panel results include NUTS3 dum-
mies. All specifications include year dummies, time-varying controls and NUTS2 time trends.
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Table 9: Robustness checks: immigrant demand on rents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Spain Spain2 GRAV c3 GRAV c2 GRAV c4
Population rate (t-1) 0.616** 0.686** 0.754** 0.615* 0.09 0.142
[0.279] [0.279] [0.339] [0.363] [0.433] [0.597]
Test weak identification 24.23 21.16 16.27 14.36 5.56 4.92
Eth 2001 Eth 1985 Eth 1981 NUTS1 tr NUTS1 yrD NUTS2 tr
Population rate (t-1) 0.519*** 0.167 0.127 0.590** 0.583** 0.648**
[0.167] [0.246] [0.365] [0.300] [0.283] [0.271]
Test weak identification 172.63 46.66 14.56 20.17 24.16 25.41
Den POP Den NAT Den NAT81 GatesIV 2 IVs EU 2 IVs P–I–G
Population rate (t-1) 0.775** 0.989** 0.837** 2.789 0.595** 0.616**
[0.372] [0.481] [0.395] [6.534] [0.273] [0.277]
Test weak identification 27.79 18.11 29.52 0.22 13.57 12.45
Test over identification 0.59 0.96
FS Ethnic IV 0.642*** 0.644***
FS Gates IV 0.016* 0.009
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550
Notes: All specifications include NUTS2, year dummies and province attributes. Province attributes as in Table 2.
Table 10: Robustness checks: immigrant demand on house prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Spain Spain2 GRAV c3 GRAV c2 GRAV c4
Population rate (t-1) 2.284*** 2.415*** 2.548** 3.407* -0.951 -2.195
[0.780] [0.887] [1.024] [1.933] [1.849] [3.344]
Test weak identification 25.89 22.61 17.58 15.07 6.23 5.61
Eth 2001 Eth 1985 Eth 1981 NUTS1 tr NUTS1 yrD NUTS2 tr
Population rate (t-1) 1.574*** 1.348* 1.998** 2.386*** 2.289*** 2.323***
[0.447] [0.814] [0.938] [0.820] [0.806] [0.764]
Test weak identification 188.21 50.19 14.24 21.96 26.46 26.81
Den POP Den NAT Den NAT81 GatesIV 2 IVs EU 2 IVs P–I–G
Population rate (t-1) 2.027** 2.069* 2.781*** 21.436 2.239*** 2.308***
[0.927] [1.173] [0.991] [37.550] [0.773] [0.783]
Test weak identification 30.88 21.18 32.19 0.21 14.63 13.34
Test over identification 0.67 0.62
FS Ethnic IV 0..668*** 0.667***
FS Gates IV 0.015* 0.009
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550
Notes: All specifications include NUTS3 and year dummies.
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Appendix
A.1 Data
A.1.1 Data sources
The spatial unit of analysis in the paper is the province (NUTS3). I exclude Ceuta and Melilla because
of their particular history and lack of data. I use data from 2002 to 2012 – the population data is dated
in January so it refers to the beginning of the period.
I use data on total, foreign-born and native population from the Spanish population municipality
registers (yearly). The number of residents in a municipality is registered by the city councils in an
administrative register called the Municipal Register (Padro´n Municipal). An annual record of the
municipal register, dated on the 1st January of each year, is obtained from its updates. This dataset
provides precise information on the population figures, on a yearly basis. It is also more accurate
than other population sources because it collects the total number of foreign-born residents even if
they are illegal immigrants57. Immigrants are identified using foreign-born population (by country
of birth), not nationality. The figures are dates at the beginning of the natural year (1st of January).
Even if this data is available since 1996, I focus on the period after 2001 for several reasons. First,
Ferna´ndez-Huertas et al. (2009) and Bertoli et al. (2011) recommend the use of population data co-
ming from the population registers (Padro´n) from 2001 because its reliability improves after that year.
Secondly, it is after 2001 that the stock of foreign-born starts increasing significantly. It could be the
case that most entries started in 2001 or that the stocks started to be correctly measured after that year.
To mitigate measurement error I then focus on 2001-2012 for the main analysis. Thirdly, the rents data
is only available from 2001 so focusing on this time period allows us to compare the rental and sale
prices results over the same time period. Finally, using the housing boom and bust allows adoption
of a demanding estimation strategy as there is more variance in the house price growth data.
House price data comes from Uriel-Jime´nez et al. (2009), published by the Valencian Institute
of Economic Research (henceforth IVIE) jointly with the BBVA Foundation (FBBVA). The database
covers the period 1990-2007 and the IVIE prices are calculated using the original data from the (pre-
viously) Spanish Housing Department (Ministerio de Vivienda). The Housing Department (now inside
Public Works Department) official data provides the average price per square meter on dwellings sa-
les in the private sector. It is provided every quarter for all the provinces. The IVIE dataset of house
prices is constructed by weighting the official prices provided by the Housing Department to take
into account the location of the dwelling and when it was built. As the IVIE data is only available
until 2007, the dataset was expanded to 2012 by applying the provincial price growth rates from the
Housing Department official data series and adjusting the series for changes in base years. Data on
rental prices comes from the Housing Department and the National Institute of Statistics (INE). I
combine data from the National Observatory of Rented Properties (Observatorio Estatal de la Vivienda
en Alquiler) and the consumer price indices (CPI provinces - rents component) to calculate the average
rental price per square meter of the each province, from 2001 to 2012.
As a control and to construct the housing supply changes instrument I use the share of develo-
pable land in the province. The share of developable land in 2000 is obtained combining “developa-
ble” categories from the EU EEA Corine Land Cover 2000 dataset. Total area and total developable
area58 were calculated using GIS and raster maps of land use year for 2000, provided by the Corine
57However, it has two disadvantages. For confidentiality issues, data availability on the characteristics of the population
is limited (only age, gender and nationality). In addition, the immigration figures may be over-estimated because immi-
grants have to actively cancel their register when they move out of the country (if they move within the country their new
register cancels out the old one). For this reason, it is a good source to study the effect of immigration inflows but not so
good for outflows.
58The categories included in developable land are: Green urban areas, Non-irrigated arable land, Permanently irrigated
land, Rice fields, Vineyards Fruit trees and berry plantations, Olive groves, Pastures, Annual crops associated with per-
manent crops, Complex cultivation patterns, Land principally occupied by agriculture, Agro-forestry areas, Broad-leaved
forest, Coniferous forest, Mixed forest, Natural grasslands, Moors and heartland, Sclerophyllous vegetation and Burnt
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Land Cover data project (European Environment Agency). The proxy for land regulation variables
in 1999 (Planes Generales de Ordenamiento Urbanı´stico) is obtained from the Urban Areas Digital Atlas
Atlas Digital de las Areas Urbanas - ADAU, published by the (previously known as) Spanish Housing
Department (Ministerio de Vivienda). The data on housing stocks was also obtained from this Depart-
ment. Data on the political party of the major of the municipalities was obtained from the Public
Administration Department (Ministerio de Polı´tica Territorial y Administracio´n Pu´blica). I calculated the
stock of dwellings in the different years combining data from the Spanish Housing Department. Data
on the housing stock is available from 2001. Using the entry and exit flows, I calculated a rate of de-
preciation and I updated the stock of the dwellings combining the depreciation rate and construction
of dwellings data.
I also use time-invariant province characteristics (attributes) in the specifications without pro-
vince fixed effects. There are four sets of province attributes included: location-amenities attributes,
socio-economic attributes, geography and land regulation attributes and housing market attributes.
A large set of time-varying provincial variables are also included in the estimations. Summary statis-
tics for these variables (and the year in which they are measured) provided in table A.1.
The data sources for the attributes and time-varying controls variables are diverse and most of
them were obtained from the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) and the 2001 Census. Other
sources include the National Geographical Institute, La Caixa Spanish Economic Yearbook (La Caixa
Anuario Econo´mico de Espan˜a), Banking Annual Yearbook (Anuario de la Banca), Bank of Spain Statistics
(Banco de Espan˜a), the 1991, 2001 and 2011 Population and Dwelling Censuses, the Housing Depart-
ment (now Public Works Department), the IVIE-BBVA Human Capital Statistics (Estimacio´n de las
Series de Capital Humano 1964-2013), the IVIE-BBVA Regional Capital Stock Statistics (Series histo´ricas
de capital pu´blico en Espan˜a y su distribucio´n territorial (1900-2012)), the Spanish Regional Accounts
(Contabilidad Regional de Espan˜a).
Data for the IV validity regressions comes from the OECD International Migration Statistics, the
EU EEA Corine Land Cover 1990 and the Spanish National Statistics Institute. Data for the con-
struction of the gateways instrument comes from the Spanish Port Authority (AENA), the INE Natio-
nal Immigrant Survey 2007 (Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes), the National Ports Statistics Yearbooks
(Anuarios Estadı´sticos Puertos del Estado) and an online road atlas for ports-entry distances. The list of
ports was selected looking at several sources with the main ports, airports, stations and roads and
looking at those that were larger, busier and closer to the border countries.
A.1.2 Additional descriptive statistics
The period of analysis of this paper is very suitable to study the impact of immigration on housing
costs due to the large immigration wave that Spain experienced during the 2000s and the housing
boom and bust that happened during the same period (2000-2007 and 2008-2012). Table A.1 contains
summary statistics of all the variables for the 50 provinces over the 11-year period (2002–2012 for the
prices and 2001–2011 for the population variables) i.e, for the all the 550 observations of the pooled
panel. The mean total change in log (annual growth) for rents is almost 3%, while for house prices it
is around 5%. Average annual provincial population growth was around 1%, while the immigration
rate is around 0.9%. This indicates that most of the local population changes were due to the immi-
gration rate. The table also displays the summary statistics for the province time-invariant attributes
and the time-varying controls.
Figure 1 in section 3.1 provides some indicators on the evolution of immigrant inflows/stocks and
of house prices and rents during the 2001–2012 period. Figure A.1 provides additional descriptive
indicators. Panel (a) shows the evolution of the share of foreign-born population. During the period
it increased from below 5% to over 14%, particularly until 2008. Panel (b) provides some information
about the stock and inflow of immigrants from different nationality groups between 2001 and 2012
(as listed in table A.2). We see that the largest sending group was Latin-America, with over 1.5 million
areas.
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people over the period, followed by Eastern-Europe (over 1 million), other norther EU15 countries
(over 0.5 million) and north African countries (around 0.5 million). These four origin groups, which
are very different in terms of geography and cultural background, account for 3.5 million immigrants
over the period, almost 75% of the inflows. The bottom two panels of figure A.1 show the evolution
of housing units, both the stock and the changes (construction). In addition, Table 1 depicts the actual
numbers of housing stock during the period 2001 to 2012. Both together show the impressive amount
of housing constructed during this period in Spain. During the period over 4 million housing units
were built, an average of almost 400,000 per year. The trend changed sharply in 2008, when even if
still high, the annual units completed decreased from over half a million to approximately 100,000.
A.2 Further details on the construction of the instrument
A.2.1 Gravity estimations
In order for the instrument to be valid, both terms in expression (5) have to be orthogonal to local
shocks related to immigration inflows and house price growth. Local shocks have a direct impact on
total immigration inflows to Spain as these depend on national shocks which are just a combination of
local shocks. For this reason, instead of directly using national inflows by nationality in (5), I construct
a prediction based on factors that are plausibly exogenous to local shocks. Following Saiz (2007) and
Ortega & Peri (2012), I use a gravity-type model that only contains push-factors from origin to predict
the total inflow from nationality n to Spain in a given year t59. The estimated equation is:
ln
(
FB in f low f rom n to Spain,t
)
= ρ′ ln (ECONn,t−1) +ω′ ln (GEOn) + γg + λt + ξn,t (A.1)
where ECONn,t−1 is a matrix of (lagged) time-varying economic conditions of the sending country
(log of gross domestic output in real terms, log of total population, percentage of urban population,
percentage of internet users, an index of globalisation and dummy of belonging to the EU27). GEOn
is a matrix of time-invariant geographic characteristics of the sending country (log of distance to
Spain, log of area, number of cities, latitude and longitude and dummies for common language,
common border and common colonial past with Spain). I include year dummies λt and country-
group dummies γg (the groups appearing in table A.2). I can alternatively include country dummies,
which drops the time-invariant variables. I estimate a similar model using foreign-born stocks on
the left hand side (in this case the economic variables are lagged two years because population is
measure on the 1st of January). The time period is 2001 to 2011.
The economic and institutional variables come from the World Bank World Development Indica-
tors and Governance, the Globalisation Indices come from the Swiss Economic Institute (KOF Globa-
lization Index), information on EU and EUROZONE membership comes from Wikipedia, the Major
Episodes of Political Violence variables come from the Centre for Systemic Peace and the geographi-
cal and distance variables come from Centre d’E´tudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales -
CEPII.
Data is available for the 113 countries (the source countries in the Population Registers data are
119, including 6 categories for ”other” and ”stateless/unknown”) of table A.2, which represent more
than 99% of the inflows into Spain for the period. Results for different specifications are showed
in table A.3, for the total national inflows (columns 1-4) and for the national foreign-born stocks
(columns 5-8). The specifications include country and country-group dummies alternatively, and the
two first columns include year dummies while the last two do not include them. All the models have
high predictive power.
From the results in Table A.3 I recover the predicted inflows to and predicted stocks of foreign-
born in Spain from nationality n for every year 2001-2011. I use the prediction from estimates from
column 1 for the construction of the instrument, and I use the rest of the specifications estimates
59And equivalently for imputed predicted stocks.
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for the robustness checks of section 5.2. These are combined with the share by province in 1991 in a
similar manner as in (5). The imputed predicted foreign-born inflow for each nationality n to each
province i at time t becomes:
imp pred FB in f lowni,t =
(
pred FB in f lownSpain,t
)
∗ shareni,1991 (A.2)
The total imputed predicted inflow to each province i at time t is defined as the sum of (A.2) across
nationalities:
imp pred FB in f lowi,t =∑Nn
(
imp pred FB in f lowni,t
)
(A.3)
I use the lagged (A.3) in the construction of instrument (9).
A.2.2 Prediction for native location
I use past census data to predict the numbers of natives residing in province i in year t. Total natives
in a province are the sum of those born and residing there and those who were born somewhere else
in Spain and have moved there. I use an strategy that follows the same intuition as the shift-share
immigration instrument. In contrast to the immigrants prediction, in this case we need to predict
both magnitudes, i.e. stayers and movers. Therefore, we need to define a historical share and a time-
varying shift for both types of natives. Instead of countries, the origin-destination geographical units
are now the Spanish provinces. I use the province of birth of the native in the same way as the
nationality in the case of foreign-born. The strength of the instrument is now based on the historical
(im)mobility persistence of different Spanish locations (for stayers) and the “ethnic” networks (for
movers). Some regions have historically had larger mobility propensities (Galicia), and some bilateral
internal migration flows are based on historical location patterns (for example Galicians in Madrid
or Andalusians in Catalun˜a).
A person born in a given province b can either stay where he/she was born (stayers) or can
move and reside in a different province i 6= b (movers). R is the total number of provinces in Spain in
which natives can locate. For consistency, I use native location patterns from census 1991 as base year.
I define the share of stayers in province i as the proportion of natives born and living in a province
over all the natives born in the province (regardless of where they reside) in 1991 (I also use 1981 in
the robustness checks). In this case, the province of birth and residence is the same, i.e i = b. The
stayers share is defined as follows:
sharebi(i=b),1991 =
nativesbi=b,1991
∑Ri nativesbi,1991
(A.4)
Share (A.4) is multiplied by the total natives that are living in the same province where they were
born in year t. This gives the predicted number of stayers in a given province i in year t.
The share of movers is calculated differently. For a given province of birth b there are 49 potential
province destinations where the mover can reside. I therefore need to calculate further 49 shares
which represent the proportion of movers residing in a specific province i over the total number of
movers originating from province b. The movers share is defined as proportion of natives born in b
but residing in i over all the natives born in b but residing somewhere else:
sharebi(i 6=b),1991 =
nativesbi 6=b,1991
∑Ri 6=b nativesbr,1991
(A.5)
Share (A.5) is multiplied by the total number of natives living outside the province they were born in
year t (subtracting the natives living in the province for which we want to calculate the prediction,
similarly to the case of the foreign-born prediction). This predicts the number of natives born in
b living in province i (where i 6= b) in year t. For a given province of birth, there are 49 movers
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predictions.
To obtain the number of natives living in each province i at time t, I sum the prediction for stayers
and the 49 predictions for each potential province of residence (movers) in each year. This gives
imp nativesi,t which is used in the construction of (A.3).
A.3 Model extension: explaining heterogenous location patterns
The discussion in section 4 gathers all foreign-born workers under the common subscript f so it
applies to each source-country separately. But in reality the province foreign-born population is the
sum of immigrants from a variety of nationalities, and in each region the composition of the inflow
and stock of foreign-born workers can be different. The average impact of the immigration wave on
the average housing costs depend on the local mix of nationalities. In order to allow for heterogeneity
in the location patterns of immigrants by nationality we define the foreign-born workers outside-
option u f as follows:
u f =
u
ψ( 1u∗f
, Ar)
(A.6)
For foreign-born workers, the baseline (native) outside-option utility level u is normalised by the
function ψ which is a measure of the relative “attractiveness ”of a particular region r relative to the
foreign-born worker’s source country. This measure of relative attractiveness is itself related to two
arguments:
• the “un-attractiveness ”of the source country measured by 1u∗f where u
∗
f can be interpreted as
some measure of utility available in the source country.
• the “attractiveness ”of each region r to foreign-born workers, codified in an (exogenous) ame-
nity endowment Ar. This can be interpreted as an ethnic specific amenity, say the presence of a
pre-existing community ”a` la Card”.
Assuming super-modularity about ψ assures that attractive locations become relatively more at-
tractive when push factors in the source country become stronger. This is given by:
Assumption 1: Monotonicity of ψ
∂ψ(., .)
∂( 1u∗f
)
> 0
∂ψ(., .)
∂(Ar)
> 0
Assumption 2: Supermodularity of ψ
∂2ψ(., .)
∂( 1u∗f
)∂(Ar)
> 0
This set-up provides micro-foundation for why u f , even in spatial equilibrium, might differ across
regions (i.e. the complementarity of push factors in the source-country and region-specific pull fac-
tors such as the presence of a pre-existing community). In consequence, for the same push factors
in two different source countries, immigrants of different nationalities would locate in different pro-
portions across different regions. When the attractiveness of source countries falls (u∗f falls), high Ar
locations attract large numbers of immigrants and all the mechanisms highlighted in section 4.2 ope-
rate. For low Ar locations, the effects are weaker for the same fall in u∗f . In addition, this expression
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also formalises the channels through which the shift-share instrument discussed in section 2.2 predicts
the changes in foreign-born population of a particular nationality in each province and year: a com-
bination of an exogenous time-varying nationality specific push-component (predicting the number
of immigrants coming to Spain in a given period – the shift) and time-invariant nationality-specific
province preference (predicting the amount of immigrants that will locate in a particular region – the
share).
A.4 Additional figures and tables
Figure A.1: Foreign-born shares and housing over time
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Figure A.2: Spatial distribution of immigrant population and housing costs growth
(a) Foreign-born population in 2001 (b) Foreign-born population change 2001-2012
(c) House prices growth 2001-2012 (d) House rents growth 2001-2012
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Table A.1: List of variables with summary statistics
VARIABLES TIME PERIOD MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX
Housing cost and population rates
Change in log rent prices 2002/01–2012/11 0.0285 0.0174 -0.014 0.083
Change in log transaction prices 2002/01–2012/11 0.0474 0.0941 -0.157 0.276
Inflow of population over population 2001–2011 0.0105 0.0125 -0.012 0.061
Inflow of foreign-born over population 2001–2011 0.0089 0.0082 -0.005 0.046
Inflow of natives over population 2001–2011 0.0016 0.0063 -0.017 0.031
Time-varying controls
Change in log current GDP per capita 2000/99-2010/09 0.0419 0.0380 -0.086 0.132
Change in log of number of credit establishments 2000/99-2010/09 0.0053 0.0295 -0.126 0.098
Change in share of savings banks 2000/99-2010/09 0.0042 0.0248 -0.313 0.049
Change in unemployment rate 2000/99-2010/09 0.0035 0.0302 -0.134 0.097
Change average years of education employed 2000/99-2010/09 0.1245 0.1826 -0.267 0.229
Change share of WAP without studies 2000/99-2010/09 -0.0133 0.0336 -0.071 0.060
Change in log average wage 2000/99-2010/09 0.0356 0.0218 -0.029 0.119
Change in log urban infrastructure capital 2000/99-2010/09 0.0695 0.0544 -0.038 0.357
Change in log transport infrastructure capital 2000/99-2010/09 0.0735 0.0431 -0.035 0.370
Change share employed primary 2000/99-2010/09 -0.0035 0.0140 -0.074 0.081
Change share employed secondary 2000/99-2010/09 -0.0036 0.0147 -0.045 0.051
Change share employed non-tradable services 2000/99-2010/09 0.0023 0.0131 -0.037 0.049
Change share employed tradable services 2000/99-2010/09 0.0068 0.0191 -0.067 0.060
Change in log stock of total housing 2000/99-2010/09 0.0204 0.0099 0.000 0.072
Province attributes
Coastal dummy Time-invariant 0.4400 0.4968 0.000 1.000
Length of coastline in kms Time-invariant 1.5682 2.8197 0.000 14.280
Log average temperature in January Time-invariant 1.9595 0.4623 1.078 2.903
Log average rain precipitation in January Time-invariant 3.7124 0.5835 2.777 5.364
Log of distance to Madrid Time-invariant 5.7916 0.6483 3.517 6.581
Log of distance to Barcelona Time-invariant 6.3134 0.7632 3.531 7.158
Log of total province area Time-invariant 9.0934 0.5450 7.589 9.989
Log of area of national parks 2000 11.0181 1.1309 8.501 12.622
Log of number of retail shops 2000 9.4060 0.7779 7.745 11.511
Log of number of restaurants and bars 2000 8.1272 0.9008 5.697 10.347
Tourism importance index 2000 19.9704 32.0339 1.270 163.290
Log of number of doctors 2000 7.5119 1.0932 3.332 10.232
Log of population (Padron) 2001 13.2241 0.8402 11.422 15.496
Share of foreign-born population (Padron) 2001 0.0371 0.0254 0.006 0.088
Employment rate of foreign-born (Census) 2001 0.0354 0.0244 0.009 0.107
Share of single-person households 2001 0.2130 0.0270 0.158 0.266
Average household size 2001 2.8363 0.1553 2.621 3.207
Share of households with children 2001 0.4018 0.0538 0.294 0.549
Share of developable land (Corine) 2000 0.8542 0.0736 0.466 0.961
Average ruggedness index Time-invariant 110.3139 48.2490 31.030 247.614
Average height index Time-invariant 95.1959 39.7684 20.394 165.226
Altitude max-min difference Time-invariant 19.0384 6.7611 3.190 37.150
Number of localities with over 10k inhabitants 2000 12.7200 12.5030 1.000 65.000
Share of population living in cities of 50k+ inhab 2000 0.3842 0.1904 0.000 0.845
Share of municipalities with general planning 1999 0.1085 0.1101 0.005 0.471
Share of municipalities with no planning 1999 0.2211 0.2179 0.000 0.770
Share of population in right-wing major towns 2001 0.5444 0.2521 0.017 0.879
Share of population who rent 2001 0.0915 0.0286 0.058 0.187
Share of secondary family homes 2001 0.1896 0.0893 0.045 0.424
Share of empty family homes 2001 0.1485 0.0241 0.085 0.191
Share of employment in construction 2001 0.1261 0.0209 0.083 0.170
Share of social housing units 2000 0.1284 0.0969 0.000 0.351
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Table A.2: List of countries of origin and nationality groups
COUNTRY NATIONALITY GROUP COUNTRY NATIONALITY GROUP
Austria EU15 NORTH Angola REST OF AFRICA
Belgium EU15 NORTH Cameroon REST OF AFRICA
Denmark EU15 NORTH Congo REST OF AFRICA
Finland EU15 NORTH Ethiopia REST OF AFRICA
France EU15 NORTH Guinea Bissau REST OF AFRICA
Iceland EU15 NORTH Kenya REST OF AFRICA
Liechtenstein EU15 NORTH South Africa REST OF AFRICA
Luxembourg EU15 NORTH Zaire REST OF AFRICA
Norway EU15 NORTH Costa Rica CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
Netherlands EU15 NORTH Cuba CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
United Kingdom EU15 NORTH Dominica CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
Germany EU15 NORTH El Salvador CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
Sweden EU15 NORTH Guatemala CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
Switzerland EU15 NORTH Honduras CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
Cyprus EU15 SOUTH Nicaragua CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
Greece EU15 SOUTH Panama CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
Ireland EU15 SOUTH Dominican Republic CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN
Italy EU15 SOUTH Mexico LATIN AMERICAN AND BRAZIL
Portugal EU15 SOUTH Argentina LATIN AMERICAN AND BRAZIL
Andorra EU15 SOUTH Bolivia LATIN AMERICAN AND BRAZIL
Bulgaria EU27 EAST EUROPE Brazil LATIN AMERICAN AND BRAZIL
Hungary EU27 EAST EUROPE Colombia LATIN AMERICAN AND BRAZIL
Poland EU27 EAST EUROPE Chile LATIN AMERICAN AND BRAZIL
Romania EU27 EAST EUROPE Ecuador LATIN AMERICAN AND BRAZIL
Malta REST OF EUROPE Paraguay LATIN AMERICAN AND BRAZIL
Latvia REST OF EUROPE Peru LATIN AMERICAN AND BRAZIL
Estonia REST OF EUROPE Uruguay LATIN AMERICAN AND BRAZIL
Lithuania REST OF EUROPE Venezuela LATIN AMERICAN AND BRAZIL
Czech Republic REST OF EUROPE Canada USA AND CANADA
Slovakia REST OF EUROPE United States of America USA AND CANADA
Albania BALKANS AND TURKEY China CHINA AND FAR ASIA
Bosnia Herzegovina BALKANS AND TURKEY Philippines CHINA AND FAR ASIA
Croatia BALKANS AND TURKEY Indonesia CHINA AND FAR ASIA
Slovenia BALKANS AND TURKEY Japan CHINA AND FAR ASIA
Serbia and Montenegro BALKANS AND TURKEY South Korea CHINA AND FAR ASIA
Macedonia BALKANS AND TURKEY Thailand CHINA AND FAR ASIA
Turkey BALKANS AND TURKEY Vietnam CHINA AND FAR ASIA
Algeria NORTH AFRICA Bangladesh INDO CONTINENT
Egypt NORTH AFRICA India INDO CONTINENT
Morocco NORTH AFRICA Nepal INDO CONTINENT
Tunisia NORTH AFRICA Pakistan INDO CONTINENT
Burkina Faso WEST AFRICA Saudi Arabia MIDDLE EAST AND ARAB
Benin WEST AFRICA Iraq MIDDLE EAST AND ARAB
Cape Verde WEST AFRICA Iran MIDDLE EAST AND ARAB
Cote d’Ivoire WEST AFRICA Israel MIDDLE EAST AND ARAB
Gambia WEST AFRICA Jordan MIDDLE EAST AND ARAB
Ghana WEST AFRICA Lebanon MIDDLE EAST AND ARAB
Guinea WEST AFRICA Syria MIDDLE EAST AND ARAB
Guinea Equatorial WEST AFRICA Ukraine RUSSIA AND EX-SOVIET UNION
Liberia WEST AFRICA Moldova RUSSIA AND EX-SOVIET UNION
Mali WEST AFRICA Belarus RUSSIA AND EX-SOVIET UNION
Mauritania WEST AFRICA Georgia RUSSIA AND EX-SOVIET UNION
Nigeria WEST AFRICA Armenia RUSSIA AND EX-SOVIET UNION
Senegal WEST AFRICA Russia RUSSIA AND EX-SOVIET UNION
Sierra Leone WEST AFRICA Kazakhstan RUSSIA AND EX-SOVIET UNION
Togo WEST AFRICA Australia OCEANIA
New Zealand OCEANIA
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Table A.3: Gravity equations immigrant inflow and stock by country
Log number of immigrants from country n to/in Spain in t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
INFLOW DURING T STOCK IN JAN T
Lag1/2 Log current -0.673 -0.658** -0.755 -0.658** 0.048 -0.390 0.599** -0.399
GDP in Bill USD [0.538] [0.301] [0.471] [0.304] [0.237] [0.274] [0.271] [0.273]
Lag1/2 Log of GDP 0.970 0.659 0.679 -0.153 0.220 0.689 -0.341 1.017***
Deflator [0.618] [0.478] [0.582] [0.385] [0.298] [0.437] [0.337] [0.353]
Lag1/2 Log population 1.639 0.793** 0.285 0.796** -2.852*** 0.705** -0.803 0.719**
in 1000s [1.352] [0.318] [1.307] [0.323] [0.678] [0.312] [0.718] [0.309]
Lag1/2 Life expectancy 0.164** -0.001 0.028 -0.020 0.069* 0.004 0.120** 0.011
in years [0.078] [0.040] [0.081] [0.039] [0.040] [0.032] [0.049] [0.032]
Lag1/2 Percentage of -2.835 0.804 -1.388 0.667 -1.536 0.746 -2.240* 0.767
agricultural land [2.244] [0.590] [2.233] [0.600] [1.139] [0.558] [1.282] [0.552]
Lag1/2 Percentage of 4.951 2.920*** 0.561 2.945*** 0.791 2.900*** 3.860** 2.852***
urban population [3.087] [0.988] [2.763] [1.004] [1.667] [1.032] [1.748] [1.028]
Lag1/2 Internet take-up -0.516 0.729 -2.111*** -0.693 -1.301*** 0.482 0.160 1.097**
per 100 people [0.642] [0.764] [0.448] [0.624] [0.317] [0.554] [0.227] [0.461]
Lag1/2 Unemployment 3.317* 4.197** 3.178* 4.251** -0.045 5.188*** -0.439 5.199***
rate total [1.872] [1.830] [1.806] [1.818] [0.787] [1.679] [0.936] [1.677]
Lag1/2 Share Services -2.257 1.590 -0.941 1.603 -1.382 1.648 0.680 1.785
in Value-Added [1.971] [1.686] [1.926] [1.715] [1.605] [1.267] [1.624] [1.232]
Lag1/2 Share Industry -1.852 4.377** 0.810 4.426** -2.203 4.330*** -0.499 4.457***
in Value-Added [2.053] [1.979] [1.977] [1.974] [1.665] [1.494] [1.695] [1.459]
Lag1/2 Index of political 0.003 0.038*** -0.002 0.035*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.008 0.039***
globalisation [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.005] [0.010] [0.006] [0.009]
Lag1/2 Index of social -0.005 -0.014 -0.005 -0.012 -0.004 -0.017 0.010 -0.018
globalisation [0.015] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.008] [0.016] [0.009] [0.016]
Lag1/2 Index of economic 0.016 -0.013 0.017 -0.014 0.013** -0.009 0.021*** -0.005
globalisation [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.006] [0.011] [0.006] [0.010]
Source contry belongs to 0.697*** 0.738** 0.998*** 1.007*** 0.419*** 0.803*** 0.471*** 0.786***
the European Union [0.228] [0.288] [0.244] [0.286] [0.135] [0.294] [0.126] [0.277]
Source contry belongs to 0.103 -0.080 -0.134 -0.280 0.084 -0.227 -0.046 -0.226
the Euro Zone [0.282] [0.298] [0.336] [0.294] [0.107] [0.308] [0.115] [0.305]
Log distance from source -1.909*** -1.887*** -1.627*** -1.625***
country capital to Madrid [0.519] [0.539] [0.511] [0.502]
Log area in square 0.260* 0.242* 0.025 0.027
kilometres [0.135] [0.139] [0.134] [0.132]
Number of cities in -0.074 -0.078 -0.065 -0.068
Henderson data [0.051] [0.052] [0.051] [0.050]
Spanish is spoken by 0.117 -0.024 -0.349 -0.324
at least 20% population [0.999] [0.957] [0.925] [0.947]
Source country -0.309 -0.213 0.022 0.053
is contiguous to Spain [0.544] [0.568] [0.562] [0.542]
Source country was ever 0.963 0.901 1.146 1.148
a Spanish colony [0.884] [0.831] [0.884] [0.903]
Observations 1015 1015 1015 1015 1243 1243 1243 1243
Area dummies Country NatiGro Country NatiGro Country NatiGro Country NatiGro
Year dummies 4 4 4 4
F-test model 22.53 18.14 7.16 12.58 32.22 25.80 22.24 23.28
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.65 0.85 0.62 0.98 0.72 0.97 0.72
Notes: Clustered (country) standard errors in brackets. t=2001/2011. The number of countries in the sample is 113. Note that sometimes
country inflows are zero or negative so the number of observations in columns 1-4 is smaller than in columns 4-8. EU/EUROZONE
membership dummy changes over time as new countries join the Union. NatiGro refers to nationality groups as defined in Table A.2.
Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 include longitude and latitude of the country centroid in degrees. All models include WB Governance indicators
and Major Episodes of Political Violence variables. The economic explanatory variables are lagged one or two periods depending on
the variable used on the LHS (inflow or stocks). Significance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table A.4: Robustness checks: list of ports of entry
Mode Gate Name Mode Gate Name
Raft Las playitas en Fuerteventura Boat Puerto de Alicante
Raft Punta de Tarifa Boat Puerto de Santa Cruz de Tenerife
Raft Playa del Ingles Las Palmas Boat Puerto de Bilbao
Walk Puesto fronterizo Ceuta Boat Puerto de A Corun˜a
Walk Puesto fronterizo Melilla Boat Puerto de Malaga
Plane Aeropuerto de Madrid-Barajas Boat Puerto de Valencia
Plane Aeropuerto de Barcelona-El Prat Boat Puerto de Ceuta
Plane Aeropuerto de Palma de Mallorca Road La Jonquera
Plane Aeropuerto de Malaga Road Irun/Hendaya
Plane Aeropuerto de Gran Canaria Road Roncesvalles
Plane Aeropuerto de Tenerife Sur Road Candanchu
Plane Aeropuerto de Alicante Road Puigcerda
Plane Aeropuerto de Lanazarote Road Valenca, Portugal
Plane Aeropuerto de Ibiza Road Badajoz
Plane Aeropuerto de Fuerteventura Road Ayamonte
Plane Aeropuerto de Menorca Rail Latour de Carol
Plane Aeropuerto de Tenerife Norte Rail Portbou/Cerbere
Plane Aeropuerto de Bilbao Rail Canfranc
Plane Aeropuerto de Valencia-Manises Rail Hendaya
Plane Aeropuerto de Sevilla Rail Vigo/Tui
Plane Aeropuerto de Santiago de Compostela Rail Fuentes de Ouoro
Boat Puerto de Barcelona Rail Valencia de Alcantara
Boat Puerto Bahia de Algeciras Rail Badajoz
Boat Puerto de Santander Rail Madrid Estacion de Atocha
Boat Puerto de Almeria-Motril Rail Barcelona Estacion de Francia
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Table A.5: Robustness checks: other population measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in log rents in t
Rate (t-1) 0.834** 0.807** 0.789** 0.747** 0.616** 0.566**
[0.406] [0.390] [0.389] [0.376] [0.279] [0.259]
Test weak identification 16.47 17.45 16.54 13.31 24.23 21.36
Change in log prices in t
Rate (t-1) 3.073*** 2.976*** 2.908*** 2.755** 2.284*** 2.119***
[1.170] [1.116] [1.112] [1.091] [0.780] [0.728]
Test weak identification 18.05 19.05 18.28 14.71 25.89 22.45
Population variable FBORN WAFB FOREIGN WAFOR POP WAP
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550
Notes: All specifications include time-varying controls and year dummies. Top panel includes NUTS2 dum-
mies and all province attributes. Bottom panel includes NUTS3 dummies.
Table A.6: Robustness checks: other outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total effect
Immigration rate (t-1) 3.073*** 2.983*** 3.479*** 0.890* 0.902*
[1.170] [1.049] [1.176] [0.492] [0.495]
Test weak identification 18.05 18.05 18.05 18.05 16.47
Immigrant effect
Population rate (t-1) 2.284*** 2.217*** 2.586*** 0.662** 0.667**
[0.780] [0.716] [0.782] [0.325] [0.324]
Test weak identification 25.89 25.89 25.89 25.89 24.23
Observations 550 550 550 550 550
LHS variable HP IVIE HP AVER HP 2Q HSTOCK HSTOCK
Area dummies NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS2
Notes: All specifications include year dummies.
Table A.7: Robustness checks: long-differences
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RENTS HPRICES NAT MOB RENTS HPRICES
Immigration rate (LD5) 0.985*** 2.315* 0.355**
[0.371] [1.211] [0.155]
Population rate (LD5) 0.727*** 1.709*
[0.271] [0.884]
First Stage Coefficients
Immigration rate IV (LD5) 0.579*** 0.784***
[0.086] [0.159]
Test weak identification 28.4 15.12
Notes: Both the outcomes and the population/immigration rates are calculated using 5-year time
differences for the same time periods. The sample period is 2011/2001, with two long differences
for years 2001/06 and 2006/01. The number of observations is then 100. The estimations include
NUTS2 and time dummies, time-varying controls (log GDPpc, log average wage, log infrastructure
capital, sectoral structure employment shares) and province attributes (location/amenities).
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Table A.8: Robustness checks: timing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in log rents in t
Population rate (t-2) 0.350* 0.343
[0.206] [0.276]
Population rate (t-1) 0.616** 0.573* 0.517* 0.617*
[0.279] [0.318] [0.291] [0.332]
Population rate (t) 0.531** 0.395 0.508
[0.252] [0.255] [0.371]
Area dummies NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2 NUTS2
Test weak identification 22.48 24.23
Test weak identification CONT 11.35 6.74
Test weak identification ONE LAG 11.91 21.9 14.42
Test weak identification TWO LAGS 19.64 14.02
Change in log prices in t
Population rate (t-2) 1.327 1.481
[1.030] [1.131]
Population rate (t-1) 2.284*** 1.679** 1.841*** 1.599**
[0.780] [0.675] [0.566] [0.685]
Population rate (t) 1.597 0.812 -0.256
[1.342] [1.546] [1.319]
Area dummies NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3
Test weak identification 26.64 25.89
Test weak identification CONT 12.65 7.56
Test weak identification ONE LAG 13.08 24.46 16.29
Test weak identification TWO LAGS 22.01 16
Native population rate
Immigration rate (t-2) -0.037 -0.094
[0.088] [0.095]
Immigration rate (t-1) 0.075 -0.01 0.00 -0.02
[0.086] [0.078] [0.086] [0.089]
Immigration rate (t) 0.349*** 0.309*** 0.297**
[0.127] [0.118] [0.116]
Area dummies NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3 NUTS3
Test weak identification 16.8 17.49
Test weak identification CONT 8.72 4.96
Test weak identification ONE LAG 9.23 10.4 6.99
Test weak identification TWO LAGS 10.8 7.21
Observations 500 550 500 500 450
Notes: All specifications include time-varying controls and year dummies. The sample period is
2002/2012 for house prices and 2001/2011 for native mobility.
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